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1.  INTRODUCTION 
During the battle of Belleau Woods in France during the First World War, 
German troops said the United States (U.S.) Marines fought like "dogs from 
hell" and subsequently gave them the nickname Teufelshunde--"Devil Dogs." 
By the time the U.S. entered the war, it had already deployed these "Devil 
Dogs" to the tropics of Central America and the Caribbean in a series of 
expeditions that Americans would later refer to as the "Banana Wars." These 
"wars" occurred during the period loosely defined by the years 1898-1934. 
The history of U.S.-Latin American relations documents the passions, 
contradictions, and misunderstandings that have produced national policies 
of monumental human consequence. In 1940, Professor J. Fred Rippy of the 
University of Chicago wrote in reference to Latin America that, "in this region 
the policy of the United States has departed from ideal standards of 
international morality more widely than elsewhere."'  To appreciate the 
complex nature of this legacy, one must search for historical elements of 
continuity to understand that which defies easy explanation--why the U.S. 
has often developed adversarial relationships with neighbors whom with it 
shares considerable vested interests. 
Emerging as a global power at the turn of this century, the U.S. attempted 
to define its growing "vital" interests.  Primarily matters dealing with security 2 
and economic expansion, these "vital" interests combined with the nation's 
sense of moral mission to provide Washington the justification to pursue an 
insular empire in Central America and the Caribbean. With their frontier now 
closed, many North Americans cast their eyes on foreign shores, seeking 
new fields to cultivate the seeds of democracy and from which to reap the 
fruits of continued national expansion. 
Americans dutifully  assumed  their  responsibilities  as "guardian  of 
democracy" in the Western Hemisphere and exercised their manifest right to 
influence and shape the Americas.  By interjecting themselves into the 
internal affairs of their neighbors to the south, Latin Americans might be 
"saved from themselves for themselves."2 The U.S. also hoped to benefit from 
this arrangement, since it would "gain a stable, and friendly neighbor, and a 
reliable customer."3 The Monroe Doctrine served as the commission for this 
noble stewardship of peoples. 
Latin Americans, however, have rarely shared the same zeal for this 
intrusion. Instead, many hold in contempt "the Monroe Doctrine which seems 
to have the most enviable elasticity for adapting  itself to all imaginable 
situations which is explained by the fact that the United States always 
jealously reserves the privilege of interpreting  it in every case according to 
the political interest of the moment."4 These contrasting viewpoints represent 
an important element in the controversy underlying the history of relations 
between the U.S. and all of Latin America. The U.S. eventually intervened 
with military force on twenty-eight occasions between 1900 and 1930.5 Much 
of the hostility within this region today is the fruit of seeds planted by events 
that took place during this period. 3 
The colonial heritage and isolationist tradition of the U.S., however, posed 
significant cultural and political obstacles for national policies that resembled 
the imperialism of the Old World. In reconciling democracy with the quest for 
empire, various administrations in Washington sought resourceful methods to 
implement policy that would sustain public support both at home and abroad. 
U.S. policymakers had to develop creative means to a controversial end-
hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.  It would be these very means, 
however, that would ultimately frustrate this end.  Washington developed 
relations with Latin American countries that often created the very conditions 
that U.S. policymakers were trying to avoid--violent and chronic political 
instability. 
Imperialism by a democratic republic required ideological compromise. 
For reform by fiat was not a job for diplomats, teachers, or technocrats, 
instead it required Marines, soldiers, and warships. This created a dilemma 
for U.S. policymakers since preserving and promoting stability in a nation 
required "reformers" to get involved with the social, economic, and political 
issues of that society. When the U.S. armed forces became Washington's 
"tool of choice" to effect this end, this apolitical military was transformed into 
an institution that transcended the definition of its military functions.  This 
represented a significant departure from the traditional  role of the U.S. 
military. 
This was a time in U.S. history when the War Department established a 
separate Department of Insular Affairs to coordinate matters of colonial 
administration.  In this era, warriors often played the role of diplomats.  U.S. 4 
military officers would exercise civil authority within foreign governments, and 
become the official, or unofficial heads of sovereign states. 
In the end, this strategy failed, for it was a perversion of the American 
military tradition, void of democratic commitment, and lacked an appreciation 
for the political realities of Central America and the Caribbean republics. 
Beginning in 1922, the U.S. began liquidating this empire. The legacy of the 
"Banana Wars," however, did not end with the departure of U.S. troops. For 
Marines had effectively organized,  trained, and equipped  the Guardia 
Nacional  Dominicana,  the  Guardia  Nacional  de Nicaragua,  and the 
Garde d'Haiti. These constabularies would later be used by local strongmen 
to help establish oppressive regimes in these former American protectorates. 
President William Howard Taft championed a foreign policy that professed 
to substitute dollars for bullets in diplomacy. Each of his successors would 
also articulate a "new" approach to Latin American relations.  In many ways, 
however, the period  of 1915-1934 represented an era  in  which  U.S. 
administrations consistently substituted "devil dogs" for diplomats. 
This paper will argue that, during the U.S. interventions in Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic, and  Haiti  between 1915 and 1934, Washington 
equipped members of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps with civil and political 
powers to conduct a wide variety of nonmilitary functions that represented a 
radical departure from the North American military tradition.  This policy 
produced  disappointing  results  and  decisively  contributed  to  the 
development of conflicts in inter-American relations.  Moreover, by choosing 
to abandon temporarily the heritage of its military's traditions, Washington 
allowed its military to model inadvertently many of the more destructive 5 
features of the Latin American military tradition. By reinforcing the credibility 
of military rule, the U.S. did little to stem the more disturbing elements of 
military activism in Latin America. As a result, many Latin Americans would 
associate democracy with military rule and foreign exploitation. 
Rather than the motives and intentions behind policy, the focus of this 
analysis is on demonstrating this departure from American principles and 
traditions and its impact on U.S.-Latin American relations. 6 
Endnotes 
'Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United States, 1714-1938 (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press Publication Series, 1940), v. 
2Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States: An 
Historical Interpretation (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1971), 
185. 
3Bruce J. Calder, The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic 
during the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924, paperback ed. (Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 1988), xii. 
'Ernesto Quesada, "The Monroe Doctrine; Its Historical Evolution,"  in As 
Our Neighbors See Us: Readings in the Relations of the United States and 
Latin America, 1820-1940, ed. T. H. Reynolds (N.p.: Privately published, 
1940), 33. 
5Roger Burbach and Patricia Flynn, eds., The Politics of Intervention (New 
York: Monthly Review Press, 1984), 12. 7 
2.  FOREIGN POLICY: THE ROAD TO ABANDONMENT 
In U.S. diplomatic history there are many examples wherein U.S. citizens, 
in pursuit of national foreign policy objectives abroad, departed from the 
traditions of "democracy" as defined by the American experience.  Perhaps 
nowhere is this phenomenon better illustrated than by the use of the U.S. 
military during America's experiment with formal empire in Central America 
and the Caribbean during the "Banana Wars" of the early part of the twentieth 
century. 
For the U.S., the Spanish American War of 1898 was the demarcation 
point on a course to empire.  Puerto Rico would become a colony, while 
Cuba assumed the role of a protectorate with the ratification of the 1901 Platt 
Amendment. This would provide the U.S. with a mandate for several later 
military incursions into this young island republic.  U.S. Naval and Marine 
forces facilitated the "independence" of Panama in 1903, bringing  it into a 
nurturing dependence on its benefactor.  Political  turmoil  in Nicaragua 
precipitated the landing of Marines in 1909 and 1912. Many of these same 
troops would later establish a temporary military government in Vera Cruz in 
1914.  The U.S. would also impose customs receiverships in Nicaragua, 
Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. 
In 1941, a Marine veteran of the Banana Wars looked back on this period 
and concluded, "history is made by circumstance, circumstance is created by 
policy and policy is formulated by the necessity for a nation's security, the 
degree  of  action  taken  being  governed  by  the  importance  of  the 
circumstance."'  From 1898  to  1934,  U.S.  policymakers  interpreted 8 
circumstances in Central America and the Caribbean important enough to 
warrant a foreign policy of military intervention. 
Beginning in 1912, the U.S. Navy's Special Service Squadron would 
repeatedly return to the coast of Nicaragua to land Marines and enforce  a 
two-decade U.S. protectorate.  Washington would also dispatch Naval and 
Marine forces to establish a formal military government and occupation of the 
Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924.  Moreover, with the landing of 
Marines in Port-au-Prince on July 28, 1915, the U.S. ushered in a military 
occupation of Haiti that would last for nearly twenty years. 
During these occupations, U.S. Marines disbanded the native armies and 
police forces and were assigned by Washington with the task of creating 
apolitical constabularies, which they trained and equipped in the hopes of 
establishing order and stability in these republics. One of the most unique, 
yet disturbing elements of this policy of intervention, was that Congress 
authorized members of the U.S. armed forces to serve in a variety of 
capacities as officials  of these foreign governments.  These members 
subsequently enjoyed unprecedented  political  authority and performed 
comprehensive civil functions that had little to do with their role as U.S. 
combatants.  The results of this decision produced some of the greatest 
controversy in the history of U.S. diplomacy. 
One of the unforeseen effects of this departure from American military 
tradition was that  it  unwittingly tied the U.S. to some of the historically 
oppressive military traditions of Latin America.  Consequently, this policy 
aggravated pre-existing conditions of social injustice in occupied countries, 
and, ultimately, the failures of this strategy would threaten the best interests of 9 
all people in the Americas. In the absence of democratic commitment and an 
appreciation of the real problems of the region, the benefits of these 
occupations fell far short of the expectations of all parties involved and did 
much to foment long-term  Latin American resentment toward the U.S. 
Consequently, U.S. interventions in Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and 
Haiti during 1915-1934 provide classic case studies in diplomatic history, 
often demonstrating the bankruptcy of an "ends justify the means" foreign 
policy. 
This study is not a critique of U.S. foreign policy that investigates the 
expedients of military government on foreign soil, for American history is 
replete with the documentation of these diplomatic interludes.  Instead, this 
thesis seeks to uncover the significance of the U.S. departure from American 
military tradition, in effect, leasing military officers to foreign governments for 
the purposes of law enforcement and nation building.  These occupations 
established U.S. military governments, if not in form, at least in substance. 
And it was this subtle perversion of form that produced dangerous precedents 
and regrettable results.  As officers of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua, 
Guardia Nacional Dominicana, and Gendarmerie d'HaIti, American Marines 
were paid by both the U.S. and client nations and exercised political and 
extralegal powers not found in the North American military tradition. Because 
Washington empowered Marines,  soldiers,  and  naval  personnel  with 
previously unknown authority and autonomy, these colonial administrations 
had a grave impact on the implementation of U.S. foreign policy, the long-
term character of U.S.-Latin American relations in the twentieth century, and 
the military tradition of the U.S. armed forces. 10 
U.S. Military History: The Establishment of Tradition  
To better appreciate the potential detrimental effects that deviations from 
U.S. military tradition have on democracy, one must first uncover those 
aspects that make the U.S. military heritage unique.  To achieve this,  it  is 
helpful to review the inception and development of the U.S. military in the first 
democratic republic in the New World. 
During the War of Independence, the American colonists took up armed 
resistance and formed an army to effect a political end--the founding of a free 
and independent nation that would radically break from the conventions of 
history to serve as the world's model for "a government of laws and not of 
men."2 This was an army of the people that fought to establish a government 
by and for the people.  It voluntarily subjugated itself to civil authority and 
fought for the rights of the individual and for freedom from oppressive foreign 
rule, colonial exploitation, and in real terms, fought against an imperial army 
of occupation. 
The democratic ideals on which the U.S. was founded intimately shaped 
its military as an institution and established traditions in its armed forces that 
its founding fathers viewed as requisite for the republic's survival against 
oppression from within and military threats from without. As military historian 
Russell F. Weigley notes, the American Revolution, having been fought by a 
citizen army against a professional foreign military, "created in America a 
tradition  of  the  nonprofessional  soldier,  of  the  armed  citizenry."3 
Consequently, Thomas Jefferson and other early American leaders were very 
concerned about the potential threat that a standing professional army posed 11 
and adamantly lobbied for protection under the Constitution against such a 
national force.4 
Because of this heritage, the role of the American armed forces has 
always been, first and foremost, to provide for the common defense of the 
nation against foreign military threats to national security.  Except in rare 
circumstances of temporary national emergency, these forces have not been 
assigned by the government to perform police or civil domestic functions. 
There have been only a few incidents in which the U.S. government used 
military force against its own citizens. The 1894 Pullman Strike in Chicago, 
the 1932 Veteran protest in Washington, D.C., the civil rights and anti-war 
demonstrations of the 1960s and 1970s, and more recently the 1992 Los 
Angeles riot following the Rodney King trial, serve as a few examples. 
Nonetheless, on those few occasions when the regular armed forces have 
been used in domestic affairs, they have always remained under the strict 
command of civil authorities. U.S. statutes appoint the U.S. Attorney General 
as the designated chief civilian with the authority to coordinate federal action 
in these cases of civil disturbance.5 
In the U.S., civil authority over the military is institutionalized  Under the 
Constitution, the president, as the commander-in-chief, shares with Congress 
authority over the military. While the Constitution invests Congress with the 
power to raise and support armies and to declare war,  it designates the 
president as the authority who directs the conduct of these forces.6  In 
addition, civilians are appointed as the chief executives for each of the 
departments of the armed forces. Military members also remain subject to the 
same local, state, and federal laws as their civilian counterparts while in the 12 
service of their nation.  Although it does enter into political competition for 
government resources and favor, the military, as an institution, is apolitical in 
the U.S.,  in that its authority does not rest on the personal alliances, 
individual  interests,  or  political  influence  of those  in  uniform.  Most 
importantly, the U.S. military never acts independently of the legitimate 
political structures of the larger American society. 
In the U.S., there is also general distaste for politics within the ranks of the 
professional military. Commenting on this characteristic of the U.S. military 
experience, Richard D. Challenger notes, "Relatively few officers wanted to 
cross over the line that separated the military from the political. There was, in 
short, continuing respect for the traditional  separation  of powers and 
functions."' By Law, military leaders are not allowed to hold political office or 
exercise formal political power.  Falling under federal authority,  military 
members are also insulated from the influence of local political leaders that 
might lead to corruption and/or conflicting loyalties.  Authority in the U.S. 
military is conferred by the power vested in it by the popularly elected civilian 
representatives of the federal government and not by the power of its guns. 
Furthermore, positions of authority within the military are based primarily on 
performance and competence without regard to family name, wealth, or 
political persuasion. 
Members of the U.S. armed forces are also strictly forbidden to receive 
personal gain from the performance of their duties aside from salaries and 
benefits dictated by Congress. The volunteer tradition of the U.S. military 
has, in fact, nurtured the general national sentiment that, "a man does not go 
into the army for $15 a month, but he goes into it stimulated by patriotism and 13 
not by the hope of gain."8  Moreover, the military does not collect its own 
revenues or those of the government. Positions of military leadership confer 
neither economic nor political power in the U.S.  In fact, military members 
sacrifice many of the rights and privileges that democracy guarantees other 
members of society. Nonetheless, many of these characteristics defining the 
U.S. military tradition would be altered in the experience of Americans in 
uniform serving in the tropics after the turn of the twentieth century. 
Because of its colonial experience and its subsequent tendency toward 
isolationism, the U.S. was slow to develop and articulate a national strategy 
in the use of military force in foreign relations.  Until the Second World War, 
Weigley argues that, "The United States usually possessed no national 
strategy for the employment of force or threat of force to attain political ends, 
except as the nation used force in wartime openly and directly in pursuit of 
military victories as complete as was desired or possible." 9  This was 
demonstrated by the general lack of national policy in the use of U.S. armed 
forces abroad in cases short of war, e.g., military interventions in Nicaragua, 
the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. This also facilitated the perversion of U.S. 
military tradition abroad as Washington assigned members of its armed 
forces with the job of implementing an evolving foreign policy that reacted to 
developing international circumstances. Not equipped to meet the political, 
economic, and social challenges this assignment demanded, the U.S. 
military proved unable, in the end, to achieve the nonmilitary objectives of the 
nation's foreign policy. 14 
U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Defining Roles  
In the conduct of American diplomacy,  historian  William Appleman 
Williams observed that, "It was civilians who defined the world in military 
terms, not the military that usurped civilian powers. Once the military had 
been called in, they quite naturally gained more influence because the 
situation had been defined in a way that put a premium on their particular 
knowledge and experience.' 
Many individuals who enjoy physical strength are strongly tempted to use 
force to resolve problems. The same is true of nations. For those countries 
that enjoy an advantage of power over other nations, military options appear 
as attractive solutions to political problems. To those governments with the 
material assets to  effect  it,  this option  offers the prospect of forcing 
compliance on a belligerent party and provides greater control over the short-
term outcome of events.  The greater the perceived immediate need for 
influencing and controlling foreign events, the greater the tendency to use 
military force.  In the absence of imminent threats to life and country, a nation 
can also attempt to justify the use of force by defining political circumstances 
in terms that appear to warrant military solutions or can reshape the military 
as an agent for political solutions.  During interventions in Central America 
and the Caribbean, Washington did both. 
Once Washington empowered its military with the authority to administer 
the  civil  functions  of colonial  government, there soon developed,  as 
explained by Williams's observation, a conflict between American military 
and civil authorities. As Hans Schmidt, in his book on the Haitian occupation, 15 
points out, "The major point of conflict between military and civilian officials 
centered around who was in charge.  The treaty officials resented the 
interference and usurpation of power by the Marines, and the Marines felt 
they had complete authority by virtue of the alleged paramount necessity of 
maintaining American authority." 
The question then that needs answering is, how could Marines, arguably 
some of the most disciplined guardians of American military tradition in the 
U.S., be in such contempt of civil authority when on foreign shores?  I argue 
that this was a symptom of a temporary perversion of U.S. military tradition 
created by Washington's program of reshaping this Corps of Marines into an 
instrument of foreign political change.  It was also facilitated by the double 
standards of military law promulgated at the time, wherein: 
When operating on foreign soil the legal obligations of the dominant  
military are tested by one rule; when within their own territory by a  
wholly different rule, having regard to the civil and property rights of  
the inhabitants. What may be permissible to the commander in the  
exercise of his authority in the former, with no responsibility other than  
his military superiors, might, in the latter, subject him to grave civil  
responsibilities.12  
In many ways, the U.S. policy of intervention in Central America and the 
Caribbean transformed an instrument of war into an institution of political 
authority. As such, the U.S. placed members of its armed forces in a role 
more consistent with the Latin American than the North American military 
tradition.  Unfortunately, in performing the duties of an occupational force, 
these Americans in uniform adopted some of the more negative aspects of 
this Latin American heritage. 16 
The Latin American Military Tradition  
In order to appreciate the significance of this development, it is important 
to understand the history behind the evolution of the military's role in Latin 
American society, for Latin American patterns of political development share 
very little  in common with the Western European and North American 
historical experiences. The military, as an institution in Latin America, has 
also developed in sharp contrast to the democratic-civilist model of the 
U.S./Europe.13 
With few exceptions, the military has actively participated in the political 
development of this region. Although it escaped its repressive colonial bonds 
early in the nineteenth century, Latin America has yet to free itself completely 
from the heritage of conflict that continues to exact a tragic human toll from its 
citizenry. Part of this continuing legacy is the violent nature of Latin American 
politics. An important element of this tradition has been the role of the armed 
forces. Many, like Latin American specialist Robert Tomasek, argue that, in 
fact, "The armed forces in most Latin American countries and in many 
underdeveloped areas have been the major power group in  politics."14 
Whether or not one agrees with this view, the fact that the armed forces have 
made a considerable,  often crucial,  impact on Latin American political 
processes is indisputable.  For as John Fitch reminds us, "Since the end of 
the Second World War every Latin American country, except Mexico, has 
experienced at least one military coup d' etat."15 This military activism has its 
roots strongly planted in the soil of the past. 17 
Conquest by the conquistadors and royal expeditions ushered in a new 
heritage of military and political violence into the New World. Martial values 
attained through continuous war were imported from the Iberian peninsula. 
The centuries-long rule of this tradition  left an indelible mark on Latin 
American culture. The military enjoyed great prestige since it played a vital 
role in the maintenance of empire. During this early period, military officers 
came from the elite. The Viceroys, the political agents of the crown, also held 
exalted military rank.  This rank helped them to consolidate and legitimize 
their political control over the colonies. 
During the colonial period, Latin American society was supported by the 
three legs of the economic elites, the Church, and the military. This imprinted 
a corporate-authoritarian structure on Latin American politics.16 To maintain 
an enduring empire, the crown sought loyalty over honesty from its servants 
in the New World.  In return for their loyalty to the Iberian monarchies, royal 
troops in the New World enjoyed unique privileges in the fuero militar. As E. 
Bradford Burns points out in his interpretive history of Latin America, "The 
fuero militar, a special military privilege, that exempted them from civil law  .  .  . 
established the military as a special class above the law, the effects of which 
would be increasingly disruptive for Latin American society."17  In Lyle N. 
McAlister's treatise on the fuero militar in New Spain, he concludes that 
members of the military used this privilege to evade normal civic, commercial, 
and religious jurisdictions in the pursuit of their own self-interests.  This 
tradition helped shape the establishment of the civil-military relationship in 
Latin American society. Elaborating on the detrimental impact of this pattern 
of development, McAlister adds, "One of the most disturbing  influences 18 
introduced into the society of New Spain by the reforms of Charles III was the 
privileges of the reorganized and expanded new army."1B McAlister goes on 
to point out that, with the abdication of Ferdinand VII in 1808, the loyalty to the 
crown that had held in check the "troublemaking potential" of the army 
deteriorated.  The military began to emerge as an autonomous and 
irresponsible institution, ultimately making itself the master of Mexico.19 
Between 1804 and 1824, most of Latin America gained its independence. 
Although violent armed conflict was a major part of this break with the Old 
World, there was a general lack of involvement by "organized" military units in 
the former colonies.  Burns notes that independence created a political 
vacuum in the former colonies and ushered in an age of caudillos, or strong 
leaders who, more often than not, represented elite interests.  With the 
emergence of modern states, however, armed forces would necessarily 
become increasingly organized and their roles more defined. 
During the period immediately following independence, the army was the 
only truly national institution.  It was also strongly connected to the landed 
oligarchies. Without the counterbalance of strong political systems, courting 
by elites and the caudillos produced armies that emerged as major political 
actors in the nineteenth century. These fledgling armies inherited a tradition 
of "loyalty for privilege" from their colonial past.  Military rule did not emerge, 
but instead these circumstances helped establish a praetorian tradition in 
Latin American civil-military relations.  In the absence of strong political 
infrastructures and military  professionalization,  the armed forces  often 
established or supported personalist regimes that used the military  to 
consolidate power in the hands of an individual or group of civilians. 19 
Political power has thus often been equated to the monopoly of violence 
in Latin America. Believing that this continues to be a salient feature of Latin 
American politics, John J. Johnson argues that, "The people from time to time 
choose from among five alternative sources of force: the armed services, the 
police, the civil guards, armies constituted and supplied by political parties, 
and forces raised by retired officers.  The regular services under such 
circumstances will retain an extremely strong appeal."2°  Consequently, in 
much of Latin America, people have come to anticipate military intervention 
during times of political crises. 
The turn of the twentieth century found the various national militaries in a 
state of transition toward professionalization.  As Johnson points out, the 
military professionalization that followed the First World War largely curtailed 
the phenomenon of officers moving in and out of the military virtually at will to 
pursue political agendas.  More significantly,  the Second World War 
dramatically changed the face of civil-military relationships in Latin America. 
With the participation of Mexican and Brazilian  units  in  the war, Latin 
American armed forces began to take  their  place  along  side  other 
professional militaries around the world. The incredibly destructive power of 
technological advances in warfare, the military professionalism of the allies, 
and the frightening efficacy of the nazi and fascist regimes captivated the 
Latin American military establishment.  The military successes of the allies 
demonstrated the merits of professional,  apolitical armed forces, while 
fascism demonstrated the military's ability to serve as an engine to drive 
social engineering and national development. These observations combined 
to provide a catalyst for greater prestige, professionalism, and participation by 20 
Latin American armed forces in the political and economic machinery of their 
countries. 
The close of the war, in many ways, marked the birth of a new military in 
Latin America. Armed forces increased in size, received more money, and 
gained greater influence during the post-war period. This was the beginning 
of true military institutionalism.  The heroic leaders of the past were now 
replaced by "technically trained managers of violence."21  Officers now 
became the vanguards of modernization and industrialization for many Latin 
American countries. 
Increased modernization and professionalism, however, did not create an 
apolitical military or decrease military intervention.22 Instead, with his faith in 
modernization and technical  advances, a "new officer" emerged who 
believed that his education, devotion, and vision involved him "so deeply with 
the welfare of the nation that he feels obliged to take a position on all major 
issues."23  Bureaucratic  authoritarianism  and  populist  authoritarianism 
emerged as attractive political alternatives for the military to support or 
initiate.24 Brazil and Argentina would become fertile testing grounds for the 
former, while Peru's military experimented with the latter, seeking increased 
participation in a nationalist coalition. 
To understand  the development  of  this  civil-militarism,  one  must 
appreciate important differences  in  the  historical  character of  national 
leadership between North and Latin America, a heritage that can be traced 
back to both regions' independence from colonial rule.  Unlike in the U.S. 
where the captains of industry took a leading role in national development, in 
Latin America national leadership has historically come from political actors 21 
and the military. This helped to establish a bureaucratic corporate tradition 
throughout most of Latin America.  Beyond this historical tradition, Edwin 
Lieuwen also believes that, "The environment in Latin America invited military 
rule. The decadence of the oligarchy, the political immaturity (not to mention 
the poverty and illiteracy) of the new groups aspiring to power, the lack of any 
strong, well integrated group aside from the armed forces--all  of these 
combined to encourage militarism."25 
The role of the armed forces throughout Latin America subsequently 
evolved beyond the Western military tradition of merely providing for national 
defense to that of helping to shape the "destiny of each nation."26  Since 
relatively few wars have occurred in this region of the world, nations have not 
had to focus their military resources on defending against external threats. 
Furthermore,  in  the absence of conventional  warfare,  Latin American 
soldiers, as individuals and as a group, have been less distinct from civilians 
as compared with their Western counterparts.27  Consequently, both those 
inside and outside the military have traditionally viewed these soldiers as "the 
people  in  uniform," rather than  uniquely  qualified  and distinguishable 
professionals. These factors have contributed to the domestic focus of the 
armed forces and have fueled their intimate involvement with the internal 
affairs of their countries. 
This civil-militarism is one of the few continuities throughout the richly 
diverse region known as Latin America. Since the period of independence, 
military involvement has also consistently increased throughout this region.26 
Nonetheless, this has not always been initiated by those in uniform, for as 
Jose Nun reminds contemporary observers, "all classes have courted the 22 
military."29 In fact, many sectors of Latin American society not only expect but 
demand the military's involvement in  politics.  These proponents range 
across the entire political spectrum to include those seeking the preservation 
of the present order, as well as those demanding revolutionary political 
change. The degree to which civil-militarism has permeated Latin American 
culture was poignantly expressed by Venezuelan presidential candidate, 
Rafael Caldera, when in 1959 he concluded that, "Venezuelans are so 
accustomed to see the army as a factor in their daily lives, so accustomed to 
make the army the arbiter of their political contests, that at each moment the 
most varied groups for the most dissimilar ends attempt to involve the army in 
new adventures to change our political realities."x 
The Lure of Empire 
The episodic departure from U.S. military tradition represented by the 
"Banana Wars" was the product of a process that evolved over time.  It was a 
function of the nation's deviation from its native aversion to the colonialism of 
the Old World. As the nation became a world power, it began to  extend its 
physical influence beyond its shores.  Toward the end of the nineteenth 
century, Washington reoriented its energies toward expansive policies and 
committed itself to the acquisition of foreign territories.  This created an 
increasing requirement for military expeditionary forces--Marines. Over time 
the role and function of these forces would change. 
The Spanish American War ushered in a new era of U.S. expansion. To 
the victor go the spoils, and the U.S. eventually annexed Guam, Samoa, 23 
Wake Island, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines upon the conclusion of 
this first major test of the Monroe Doctrine. As Peter Maslowski concluded, "A 
nation born more than a century earlier in a reaction to imperial domination, 
had become an imperial power."31  Exploiting the prevailing national esprit, 
Washington policymakers  drafted  the  1901  Platt  Amendment, which 
conferred upon the U.S. the authority to intervene into the affairs of Cuba in 
order to preserve its independence.  This same year, the U.S. decisively 
increased its sphere of influence in Central America by ratifying the Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty that relinquished British claims for shared rights to an 
Isthmian canal. Moreover, with the 1904 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe 
Doctrine, the U.S. reserved its right to intervene if Latin American nations, in 
exercising their independence, were not assuming the "responsibility  of 
making good use of it."32 Thus, the U.S. assumed international police powers 
for the good of the Americas and to prevent intervention from powers outside 
the Hemisphere. 
As the  self-proclaimed  "guardian  of  democracy"  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere, the U.S. began to exert its naval prowess throughout Central 
America and the Caribbean at the turn of this century. Theodore Roosevelt 
had assumed the presidency after the assassination of William Mckinley in 
September, 1901.  When this national war hero and former Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy was re-elected in 1904, American foreign policy in 
Latin America became armed with gunboats and Marines.  The U.S. had 
started building  its "New Navy" in 1882.  From 1897 to 1912, naval 
appropriations for new ships rose from $11,479,000 to $129,000,000.33 At the 
time of the Spanish American War the U.S. had twenty armored vessels; by 24 
1910 it had a total of fifty-eight.34 As historian Allan R. Mil lett notes, "The U.S. 
had come of age as a world naval power and viewed the battlefleet  as the 
nation's first line of defense and primary military instrument of great power 
diplomacy."35 
During this same period, Congress also expanded the ranks of the Marine 
Corps from 2,600 to 9,267 enlisted personnel.38  This represented a new 
emphasis within the ranks of policymakers and the military that increasing 
ground expeditionary forces was a national priority.  In 1900, the General 
Board directed the Marine Corps to reorganize and train for advance base 
operations.  By 1910,  the Marines established a formal advanced base 
school for their officers.37 These measures gave Washington the ability to 
seize advanced naval bases quickly and to project power from the sea, both 
capabilities needed for national policies of expansion.  This fact did not go 
unnoticed by the international community, as Mil lett declared, "European 
military observers noted, the U.S. had a declaratory policy of  military 
modernization and national defense, but it had a military still wedded to 
imperial policing."38 The "guardian of democracy" was now arming itself with 
colonial infantry. 
Despite a shift from "gunboat diplomacy"  to "dollar diplomacy," the 
objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America remained the same-
economic expansion, strategic security, and the penetration of Christianity 
and "progress." The U.S., as patron of the Americas, claimed its right to 
protectorates and began the job of nation building in many Central American 
and Caribbean republics with the purpose of creating an insular empire of 
fledgling democracies indebted to the U.S. and supportive of its interests. To 25 
accomplish this, the U.S. deployed two-thirds of its 17,400 Marines to foreign 
seas and shores by the end of 1927.39  In essence, from its entrance into the 
Spanish American War in 1898 to its withdrawal from Haiti in 1934, the U.S. 
conducted a series of experiments in colonial empire that temporarily altered 
the role of U.S. armed forces. 
The U.S. Military as Foreign Policy Tool 
These experiments would require a new doctrine and new tools to 
implement them. Intervention became the doctrine, and Marines became the 
tools. As Mil lett points out in his comprehensive history of the Marines, prior 
to this period and in the absence of declared war, military force was used for 
"interposition"--the temporary protection of a nation's citizens and property 
abroad. "Intervention, however, meant that military forces were used to alter 
the political behavior and even the institutions of another country."4° This new 
doctrine was soon tested. Marines were deployed to fight insurgents in the 
Philippines, support revolutionaries in Panama, and unseat the government 
in Mexico. These "soldiers of the sea" would begin effecting annexations, 
supervising  elections, establishing temporary military governments, and 
administering military occupations in several countries throughout Central 
America and the Caribbean. 
In the role of patrOn of the Western Hemisphere, President Woodrow 
Wilson assumed the stewardship of his neighbors to the south.  For Latin 
Americans, Wilson's "missionary diplomacy" proved to be "tough love" in the 
parlance of modern relationships, for he regularly dispatched missionaries 26 
with muscle--U.S. Marines. Soon "emigrados" would find themselves like  an 
unruly Honduran general, leaving "town a few feet  in advance of the 
bayonets of fifty Marines and bluejackets."'" 
Marines were evolving into more than colonial infantry, for in the end they 
would become colonial administrators as well. Over time, the Marine Corps' 
association with diplomacy would become so institutionalized that Marine 
officers would themselves refer to their Corps of  Marines as "State 
Department troops."42 This demonstrated a reshaping of both the character 
and function of the institution. This role as "State Department troops" became 
such a nationally recognized convention that in 1912 when President Taft 
wanted to send the Army to fight revolution in Nicaragua, Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson urged him to continue the use of Marines since their presence 
would not produce international repercussions given their historic function.43 
The Marines,  therefore, became the  tool  of choice  for the  policy  of 
intervention.  It would be in Central America and the Caribbean that the 
Marines would learn and hone their new skills as colonial administrators.  In 
reference to Central America in 1926, Marine Major E. W. Sturdevant urged: 
There are three reasons why the Marine Corps should know more 
about this region. Epitomized, they are as follows: 
Comparative proximity to the United States. 
Heavy American Investment. 
Disturbed political conditions. 
When these three conditions are combined, sooner or later there is a  
job for us.44  27 
Military Intervention: Warfighting and Nation building 
Noting in 1929 that the U.S. had deployed military forces abroad on more 
than one hundred occasions in the previous century, John Foster Dulles 
viewed it as "inevitable that nations interfere with each other and influence 
each other." In fact, given the punitive effect of economic sanctions on foreign 
peoples, he felt that, "there may well be situations where intervention by 
military force is the most humane procedure," as long as it does not interfere 
with the country's right to equal opportunity to development, was void of 
ulterior motives, and accountable to intelligent public opinion.45 
More and more, however, U.S. and Latin American public opinion would 
begin to question the humanitarian benefit of such intervention.  It would 
eventually apply decisive pressures on Washington to end this era of 
intervention and help to usher in the "Good Neighbor" policy. By the time of 
U.S. withdrawal from the region, even some of the most ardent supporters of 
intervention began to debate the merit of this policy. 
After fighting in virtually all the campaigns of the "Banana Wars," one of 
the Marine Corps' legends and most revered icons to this day, General 
Smedley Butler, became jaded, and in 1935 he concluded: 
I spent thirty-three years and four months in active service as a  
member of our country's most agile military forcethe Marine corps  
[sic].  I served in all commissioned ranks from a second lieutenant to  
major-general. And during that period I spent most of my time being a  
high-class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and, for the  
bankers. In short, I was a racketeer for capitalism[.]  .  .  .  Thus I helped  
make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests  
in 1914.  I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the  
National City Bank [boys] to collect revenues in  .  .  .  I helped purify  
Nicaragua for the international banking house of Brown Brothers in  
1909-1912.  I brought light to the Dominican Republic for American  28 
sugar interests in 1916.  I helped make Honduras 'right' for American 
fruit companies in 1903.46 29 
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3.  THE ADVENT OF SMALL WAR : NICARAGUA, 1912-1933 
Remembering events in May, 1910, Major Smedley D. Butler, "Old Gimlet 
Eye," recalled: "We received orders to leave at eight thirty in the morning and 
by eleven thirty we were on our way--two hundred and fifty officers and men. 
Mrs. Butler had taken the early morning train  to Panama to do some 
shopping. When she returned at noon, I was gone, and I didn't see her again 
for four months."' The Marine that would become America's most notorious 
banana warrior was off to fight what he would later refer to as the "Second 
Punic War."2 
By necessity, American "State Department troops" would eventually 
become skilled in the art of conducting "small war." These Marines learned to 
conduct counterinsurgency  operations  through  their  baptism  by  fire. 
Bloodied in deployments throughout Central America and the Caribbean, 
Marines and sailors would make at least eleven landings in Nicaragua alone 
after 1853.3 Because of the regularity of these types of expeditions, Marines 
would eventually develop their own unique fighting doctrine wherein "small 
wars" were defined as: "Operations undertaken under executive authority, 
wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or 
external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, 
or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are 
determined by the foreign policy of our Nation." And the interests of the 
nation were growing, for in the 1920s, as U.S.  officials professed the 
inalienable sovereign rights of all nations, American public schools used 
maps that labeled Nicaragua as an American protectorate.5 34 
The Prelude: A History of Intervention  
The twentieth-century record of intervention in Nicaragua began in  1909 
when the U.S. deployed forces to prevent the overthrow of President  Jose 
Santos Zelaya, a pro-American dictator. Toward the end of his sixteen-year 
rule, Zelaya began asserting his nationalism in his relations with foreigners. 
Demanding foreign recognition of his sovereignty, he confidently promoted  a 
Central American policy of outside noninterference. Zelaya's independence, 
however, collided with growing U.S. interest in the region.  As diplomatic 
relations between the two countries deteriorated, a Nicaraguan revolt broke 
out in the town of Bluefields, a Caribbean port dependent  on foreign 
investment.  In January, 1909, Conservative rebel forces started organizing 
under the leadership of Emiliano Chamorro, a Conservative Party general 
and Juan J. Estrada, a co-opted Liberal governor. Aldolfo Diaz,  an employee 
of La Luz and Los Angeles Mining Company would also eventually play a 
leading role in the revolt with the support of the U.S.6 
Throughout 1909, relations between the U.S. and Nicaragua continued to 
be strained.  To Washington, growing instability caused by the rebellion 
appeared far more detrimental to American interests than Zelaya's obstinacy. 
On December 1, Secretary of State Philander Knox, legal consultant to and 
major stockholder in the La Luz and Los Angeles Mining Company, withdrew 
U.S. recognition of Zelaya.  With U.S. support behind rebel forces, Zelaya 
resigned, naming Liberal Jose Madriz his successor. Hoping to reestablish  a 
close relationship with this key Central American republic, President William 
Howard Taft extended formal U.S. recognition of the Madriz government. 35 
The violent civil war continued into the next year, threatening the stability 
of Nicaragua's government and ravaging the nation's  economy.  As was 
customary during this period, the U.S. deployed naval forces off the coast of 
the troubled republic.  Diaz had concentrated his revolutionary forces  near 
Bluefields, where Estrada, the rebel choice for president,  was provincial 
governor. On May 16, 1910, the commander of the USS Paducah landed 
his Marines lo protect U.S. lives and property," declaring the  town of 
Bluefields a "neutral zone."  Butler and company now began to establish 
control on the ground. Butler later reflected: 
The American Consul informed us that the situation was desperate.
The revolutionists had been driven from the lake regions of  the 
interior of Nicaragua and were now hemmed in at Bluefields with the 
remnants of their troops. They had only three hundred and fifty men. 
Right outside the town was the government army with fifteen hundred 
men and some little cannon. Unless something drastic was done at 
once, the revolution would fail.  It didn't take a ton of bricks to make 
me see daylight.  It was plain  that Washington would like the 
revolutionists to come up on top.' 
Establishing  this  "neutral  zone"  effectively  prevented  the  Liberal 
government's victory over these forces.° Denied his ability to defeat rebel 
forces, President Madriz resigned and fled the country as General Estrada's 
rebel army marched into Managua on August 27.9 
After their encounters with Americans in Bluefields,  some U.S. military 
officers began to question the validity of Washington's justification for  the 
landing--the protection of "U.S. lives and property." This included the overall 
commander of the expeditionary force, Rear Admiral W. W. Kimball,  who in 
his after action report to Washington contended: 36 
After forty years experience of and on American affairs, more or less  
tangled up in Latin American relations, I have come to the conclusion  
that much if not most of our government's troubles with American  
claims against  Latin American, and especially  against  Central  
American, governments arise from the fact that aid and protection is  
apt to be given to any American interest that is financially powerful  
enough to secure good council, no matter whether it be a legitimate  
interest or, as has so often been the case, a claim for spoils resulting  
from a fraudulent concession or monopoly worked through by the aid  
of corrupt and heavily bribed officials.'°  
Indeed, historian Richard Challenger points out, the official criticisms of 
Kimball and other officers, as well as the military's impact on foreign policy 
issues outside of armed intervention, have gone largely unnoticed by 
historians." Kimball, in fact, ended his report urging Washington to send its 
ablest diplomats to this region, since "Nowhere else in the world  .  .  .  did an 
American representative serve as large an advisory role  to a foreign 
government as he did in Central America where no government moved 
without consulting the minister or consul of the United States.'12 
With the support of the U.S., Estrada proclaimed himself president.  In 
response, Washington dispatched Thomas P. Moffat, the former U.S. consul 
at Bluefields, and Thomas C. Dawson, the Consul General of Costa Rica and 
head of the State Department's Division of Latin American Affairs, to meet 
with the new government and dictate terms for U.S. recognition.  Stimson 
described such shuttle diplomacy as, "aimed solely at assisting those nations 
adequately to perform their  duties  of independence which they have 
assumed and which we have recognized."13 Dawson had previously worked 
out the details for the 1905 receivership of the Dominican Republic.14 On 
October 27, Juan J. Estrada, Adolfo Diaz, General Luis Mena, and Emiliano 
Chamorro signed the "Dawson Pact." By requiring the signatories "to lend all 37 
support in the said Constituent Assembly to the candidacy of General Juan 
Jose Estrada  .  .  .  and to that of Aldolfo Diaz," these two would become 
president and vice president respectively.  It also restricted the next election 
to presidential candidates representing the revolution and Conservative 
Party.  More significant,  it brokered the relaxation of legislation prohibiting 
foreign investors by "guaranteeing the legitimate rights of foreigners" and 
arranged for a new national loan guaranteed by the republic's custom 
receipts.15 On January 1, 1911, Estrada and Diaz officially assumed their new 
offices. 
President Estrada, however, would be in office for only a short time.  By 
the end of April, 1911, he resigned under pressure from Chamorro's control 
of the national assembly and General Mena's control of the army. The U.S. 
then instructed the Assembly on procedures to install a vice president, and on 
May 9 Diaz assumed the presidency.16 
This arrangement set the stage for the signing a month later of the Knox-
Castrillo Treaty. This convention outlined a loan arrangement by U.S. banks 
to reform the Nicaraguan economy and gave the U.S. control of a newly 
created Nicaraguan national bank.  Nicaragua's Financial  Advisor, an 
American official, brokered a loan with New York bankers that required 
Nicaragua to surrender controlling interests in its national bank, railroad, and 
steamlines.17 With many Nicaraguans unhappy with this loan proposal, the 
U.S. minister decided to help motivate them by ordering a U.S. warship to 
Corinto until the final transactions were completed.18 Although this treaty was 
not ratified by the U.S., it nonetheless paved the way for the Nicaraguan 
appointment of Clifford D. Ham, an American serving  in  the Philippine 38 
Custom Service, to the position of Collector General of Customs.  U.S. 
bankers selected this former colonel and Iowa journalist, and upon the 
unofficial approved by Secretary of State Knox, he was appointed by the 
president of Nicaragua.19 
The combination of these concessions and other similar American 
ventures created a political  backlash by Nicaraguan  nationalists  and 
members of the Nicaraguan Assembly against foreign economic threats to 
Nicaraguan sovereignty. Late in 1911, the National Assembly acted against 
the express desires of U.S. officials to enact a law that would install General 
Mena as president in January, 1913.2°  Taking up the nationalist cause, 
General Mena began assembling his military forces against the government 
on July 29, 1912. In response, on August 4, the USS Annapolis anchored in 
Corinto and dispatched a contingent  of  ninety-five  sailors  to  protect 
Americans in Managua. This force would ultimately go beyond that mission 
to fight against Mena's rebel forces near the presidential palace.21 
Ten days later, Corinto received other visitors--Major Butler landed once 
again in Nicaragua with his 354 Marines. As the advance guard for eight 
warships,  and a Marine  landing  force,  Butler and company began 
establishing U.S. control.22  Based on later published accounts of these 
events, some Marines felt their primary mission went beyond protecting U.S. 
lives and property, "to secure a peaceful settlement, mediate and establish a 
stable government, favorable to the majority."23 Butler also related, "with our 
government in Washington unofficially but definitely taking sides against the 
rebels, it was necessary to make a swift and concerted effort to restore law 
and order--also unofficially. "24 Thus, by the end of summer the U.S. deployed 39 
some 2,700 American troops  in  Nicaragua to support the increasingly 
unpopular Diaz government.2° 
On September 22, General Mena surrendered to U.S. commander-in-
chief Admiral William H. Souther land in response to an ultimatum issued by 
the admira1.26 According to Butler, he had drafted this surrender document 
and shipped Mena to Panama, making good on a horse bet with Chamorro. 
Mena got a free boat ride to Panama, and in return Butler got a black 
Peruvian  stallion.27  Despite Mena's surrender, however, rebel  forces 
continued their struggle against government and U.S. forces. Colonel "Uncle 
Joe" Pendleton joined Butler and naval units to form a provisional regiment 
and on October 4 attacked rebel forces near Coyotepe, effectively crushing 
the rebellion against Diaz.28  In the end, as historian Lester Langley noted, 
"the Dawson agreements were enforced; Old Gimlet Eye and Uncle Joe had 
upheld them."23 
Washington's champion, Aldolfo Diaz was "unanimously" reelected in a 
vote of the populace late in 1912.30 Although the U.S. did not tamper with the 
voting,  it deterred Chamorro, Diaz's popular rival leader, from entering the 
race.3'  Summarizing the conditions under which Diaz was elected, Karl 
Bermann writes: "With the country under martial law, the principle cities 
occupied by U.S. sailors and Marines, the National Assembly dissolved, and 
all those who supported the uprising disenfranchised, a presidential election 
was held.  Marines guarded the polling places and there was but one 
candidate for president: Adolfo Diaz."32 For his cooperation, Diaz appointed 
Chamorro as minister to the U.S. Thus, the U.S. became the guardians of an 40 
administration whose executive was elected by receiving three or four 
thousand votes from a population of some 700,000.33 
With the rebellion suppressed and a friendly president now firmly seated 
in Nicaragua, Washington was able to arrange for the signing of the Bryan-
Chamorro Treaty on August 5, 1914.3' The Nicaraguan economy was in 
shambles, and Washington pledged three million dollars to be spent under 
the control of U.S. officials.  In return, the U.S. gained "in perpetuity  . . . 
forever free from all taxation or other public charge, the exclusive property 
rights" to build and maintain an inter-ocean canal and the authority to 
establish naval bases on both Nicaraguan coasts "as the Government of the 
United States may select."35 More importantly, with this convention the U.S. 
was underwriting the republic's political stability, as the Platt Amendment had 
accomplished in Cuba.  Thus, the U.S. would formally reserve the right to 
intervene in order to ensure not only Nicaraguan independence, but to 
preserve American interests on the isthmus.  To receive the three million 
dollars, however, the Nicaraguan government had to accept the "Lansing 
Plan" of 1917, that effectively placed Nicaragua under formal receivership 
and made an American appointed High Commission the supreme authority in 
the country.36 
From 1912 to 1925, Marines occupied Nicaragua and bolstered the 
Conservative government  of  President  Aldolfo  Diaz.  These  "State 
Department troops" would themselves comment that, "Between 1913 and 
August, 1925, Nicaragua led  in  general a calm and peaceful national 
existence, due of course, to the presence of the Marine Legation Guard."37 
Chargé Dana G. Munro, also agreed that this small guard proved, "merely by 41 
its presence to maintain stable government in that country for some thirteen 
years . "38 
The occupation, however, was taking a toll on U.S.  resolve.  With 
stewardship came responsibility.  Congress soon faced the challenge of 
meeting the unforeseen problems created  by deploying  an army of 
occupation. On a few occasions Marines on liberty or in a deserter status 
killed or injured Nicaraguan police and civilians.  In December, 1921, and 
January, 1922, Marines killed seven Nicaraguans and wounded eight others. 
These incidents cost the U.S. government money and public support.39  It was 
becoming increasingly more costly politically for Washington to maintain its 
forces in the republic. 
In January, 1916, Chamorro succeeded Diaz in the presidential election, 
and in turn he was replaced by his uncle Diego Manuel Chamorro through 
electoral manipulation.  In 1924, the anti-Chamorro Conservative Carlos 
SolOrzano and Liberal Dr. Juan Sacasa formed a winning coalition for the 
presidential  election.  The election appeared  to be fair  to American 
observers, and the coalition won by a sizable two-to-one margin. The U.S. 
State Department and others called this the "fairest election ever held in 
Nicaragua."40 The country now appeared to have a government that enjoyed 
a broad political base and popular support.  After taking office in January, 
1925, SolOrzano promised to hold free elections in the future and, under 
State Department pressure, agreed to establish a constabulary.41  Despite 
protests of "fraud" by the Chamorro-Diaz faction, Washington recognized the 
Solorzano government. The new government would procrastinate on the 
constabulary issue until June; nonetheless, the prospect of a new era of 42 
Nicaraguan self-rule provided an attractive window of opportunity for the U.S. 
to end its thirteen-year occupation. Without the constabulary established or 
the Nicaraguan army disbanded, Washington disregarded Solarzano's pleas 
to keep the Marine legation guard in Managua and on August 3, 1925, the 
last Marines departed Nicaragua.42 
A Return to Nicaragua 
Soon after the withdrawal of U.S. troops, however, a civil war broke out 
between Conservatives and Liberals.  Washington had yet to achieve U.S. 
special envoy Lawrence Dennis's goal to "break the Nicaraguans of their 
revolutionary ways."43  On October 25, 1925, Emiliano Chamorro seized 
control of the government.  SolOrzano immediately conceded his authority, 
but Chamorro did not formally assume the presidency.  Chamorro's next 
target, Vice President Sacasa, fled to Honduras. The Nicaraguan Congress 
finally accepted SolOrzano's resignation in March, 1926.  Chamorro, under 
U.S. pressure, deferred his ascension to the presidency to Diaz, who was 
expeditiously elected by an Assembly loaded with Chamorro supporters and 
recognized by President Calvin Coolidge.TM 
The Congressional act of May 19, 1926, gave President Coolidge the 
authority to: "Upon application by foreign governments  .  .  .  to detail officers 
and enlisted men of the United States Army, Navy, and Marine Corps to 
assist the governments of the Republic of North America, Central America 
and of the Republics of Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo, in military and naval 
matters."45  This act gave Coolidge the authority to appoint U.S. service 43 
members to positions of leadership in a Nicaraguan constabulary.  During 
this same month, Marines once again landed in Bluefields.  History, however, 
would soon record the loose definition applied to "military and naval matters." 
SolOrzano quickly formed a Liberal opposition government in response to 
the Chamorro-Diaz coup. The all-too-familiar cycle of hostilities broke out, 
and from spring to December, 1926 Marines continued to establish "neutral 
zones" on the east coast.  With Nicaragua hostage to civil war, the U.S. 
initiated another full-scale military intervention beginning on Christmas Eve 
when Admiral Julian Latimer ordered Marines to land at Puerto Cabezas to 
disarm or displace Sacasa's forces in order to "protect U.S. interests and 
foreigners resident there."46  On  January 6, 1927, Diaz requested one 
hundred Marines to guard the legation in Managua. Marines would soon be 
supervising elections, replacing the Nicaraguan military with an "apolitical" 
constabulary, and fighting a formidable guerrilla insurgency, while American 
business operating  in  Nicaragua successfully lobbied  Washington  for 
continued U.S. protection of their investments.47 
Coolidge addressed Congress on January 10, and argued that, because 
of the need to protect American lives, property, and canal rights, "together 
with the obligations flowing from the investments of all classes of our citizens 
in Nicaragua, place us in a position of peculiar responsibility." Consequently, 
he insisted  that, "we have a very definite and special  interest  in the 
maintenance of order and good government in Nicaragua." He went on to 
conclude that these circumstances had combined with the potential threat of 
interference by other foreign powers to persuade him "to follow the path of my 
predecessors."48 44 
In February, fighting spread to the west as Liberal General Jose Maria 
Moncada started his march on Managua.  While Diaz proposed that 
Washington make Nicaragua an official American protectorate, the British 
chargé informed U.S. officials that, "His Britannic Majesty's Government are 
Lsic i reluctantly contemplating the dispatch of a man-of-war to the western 
coast of Nicaragua."43 
As the crisis escalated, Coolidge dispatched his friend, the experienced 
statesman Henry  L.  Stimson,  as  his  personal  envoy  to  Nicaragua. 
Commanding the president's confidence, Stimson was given great latitude in 
his fact-finding mission to determine the Nicaraguan situation.  He was to 
"investigate and report."5°  After conferring with U.S. Minister Charles C. 
Eberhardt and Admiral Latimer, Stimson took complete license from this 
prerogative, however, and brokered the Stimson-Moncado Pact or Tipitapa 
Agreement on May 4.51 
Meeting with General Moncada and a delegation of Liberals representing 
the Constitutionalist  president,  Dr. Juan Sacasa,  Stimson  finessed  a 
compromise that once again  established  the U.S. as final  arbiter  of 
Nicaraguan unrest. The Agreement called for a cease fire and disarmament 
of both sides, the establishment of a national constabulary led by American 
officers, the American supervision of lair elections" in 1928, and continued 
support of the Diaz government. Stimson implied that the U.S. was willing to 
use force to gain compliance with this accord. Moncada's delegation finally 
submitted to the convention and surrendered its weapons.52 Moncada would 
be elected president in 1928 by a 76,676 to 56,987 vote in the American-
supervised election.53 45 
According to Stimson, U.S. actions were welcomed by both Nicaragua's 
government and opposition  party and were able  "to  promote  .  . 
independence and sovereignty in the most effective way."54 He argued that 
this was not an infringement on Nicaragua's sovereignty, but instead a "policy 
of helpfulness" in action.55 The U.S. enforced or implemented this "policy of 
helpfulness" with money and Marines. Stimson did not, however, discuss all 
this with a Liberal General by the name of Augusto Cesar Sandino. 
Fighting Sandino: The Lessons of Small War 
Upon hearing of the concessions of the Stimson-Moncada agreement at 
Tipitapa, General Sandino wrote his commander, General Moncada: 
No doubt you know my temperament, and you know that  I am 
unbreakable.  I want you to come now and disarm me.  I am in my 
position and I await you. Otherwise, no one can make me give up.  I 
will not sell myself, nor will  I surrender.  I must be conquered.  I must 
comply with my duty and  I hope that my protest will remain for the 
future written in blood.56 
With this letter, the Constitutionalist general embarked on a five-and-a-half-
year personal war against government and Marine occupational forces. He 
would not compromise on his conditions for peace: the complete withdrawal 
of U.S. troops from Nicaraguan soil and the establishment of a constitutional 
government free of foreign domination.57 He would have a long wait. 
A revered leader of a radical and violent movement, Sandino rejected 
orthodox Communism and was indignant and contemptuous of conventional 
political philosophy.58 Sandino, more accurately commanded an "ideology of 
independence," and in many ways, he became both the mouthpiece and 46 
sword for an occupied, but proud people.  Sandino an uncompromising 
nationalist, refused to negotiate with the suspect Nicaraguan politicians of the 
past and violently opposed the armed occupation of his country by "yanqui 
imperialists."  Historian Joseph Bay len believes, however, that Sandino's 
actions were not only the product of his outrage at foreign intervention, but 
also his personal vendetta against General Moncado.59 Nonetheless, starting 
with twenty-nine men in October, 1926, he eventually mustered the physical, 
material, and moral support of thousands and even  more after  his 
assassination following the American withdrawal.  For from his grave he 
would serve as the rebel  icon  for a later  generation  of  Sandinista 
revolutionaries.6° 
During his war with the Marines, Sandino successfully mobilized the 
support of both Nicaraguan nationalists and the international community of 
anti-imperialists. He also fed the growing fires of anti-Americanism in Latin 
America and skillfully fought an armed insurgency against  a world power.61 
Although  losing  the  majority  of  his  militarily  engagements,  he was, 
nonetheless, ultimately victorious in achieving his primary war aim--the end 
of foreign occupation and domination.62 
Over the course of the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua, Sandino's public 
image changed.  In particular, he gained favor in the American press after 
Carleton Beals, a reporter for The Nation, published a popular series of 
personal interviews with the rebel leader in 1928.  In these articles, Beals 
effectively communicated Sandino's demands for the withdrawal of Marines, 
the appointment of a provisional president, and popular elections supervised 
by Latin American representatives.63 Sandino also wrote a letter to the New 47 
York Herald Tribune giving his condolences to the families of Americans 
killed in Nicaragua, which in a growing number of publications, earned him 
an image "as a true patriot in the tradition of Washington and Bolivar."64 He 
was also teaching the Marines a great deal concerning the art of "small war."66 
Sandino's growing popularity at home and abroad would combine with his 
command of guerrilla tactics to frustrate Marines and government troops 
attempting to capture or kill the "bandit" leader.  The American public and 
Congress also began to become frustrated, as illustrated by Senator Burton 
Wheeler's comments that, "if the business of Marines was to fight bandits, 
they should be put to better use in Chicago."66 
In 1927, American policymakers portrayed Sandino as a bandit, outlaw, 
and communist. As Bay len points out, by attacking American property and 
following the revolutionary tradition of looting, Sandino facilitated the U.S. in 
categorizing him as an outlaw bandit and thus helped Washington avoid 
incriminations that it was, in fact, suppressing a popular revolution.67 Sandino 
was not, however, the subject of the popular hostility normally reserved for a 
common "outlaw." This forced U.S. officials to temper their descriptions of the 
general.  Moreover, the use of this label raised into question the need for 
deploying thousands of Marines to fight an insignificant "bandit." Sandino the 
bandit, now became Sandino the guerrilla fighter.68 
Initially, the U.S. pursued a policy of military escalation--generally an 
unsuccessful approach in combating insurgencies. By November, 1928, U.S. 
forces in Nicaragua totaled 5,480.69 For Washington, this strategy also proved 
prohibitive in political costs and increasingly detrimental to popular support at 
home.  As historian Thomas Bailey highlights, this war waged without a 48 
declaration of war by Congress, unleashed a "storm of opposition,"7° which 
subsequently aroused significant opposition in the halls of Congress and 
within the mainstream of U.S. opinion.  Governor Edward Dunne of Illinois, 
Horace Knowles, the former U.S. minister to Nicaragua and the Dominican 
Republic, and Senator Borah of Idaho represented some of the most vocal 
opponents of the intervention in Nicaragua. Even Thomas Moffat, one of the 
brokers of the Dawson Pact, criticized the intervention!' 
Time was also on Sandino's side, for each additional day that the war 
dragged on became an embarrassment to Washington and an insult to 
Nicaraguan  sovereignty.  President  Herbert  Hoover's  administration 
responded by changing course and, in an attempt to defuse the Nicaraguan 
crisis, adopted a policy of de-escalation.  By April 1, 1932, the U.S. had 
reduced its forces in Nicaragua to 753 Marine and naval personnel, not 
counting the 205 officers in the Guardia Nacional.72  Unfortunately,  this 
compromised the support necessary for a Marine success in the field against 
their able foe. Some Marines, in fact, felt that the entire "Stimson Plan" in 
Nicaragua was a misguided departure from conventional U.S. policy in the 
region, since  it did not "grant the necessary authority to the American 
occupying forces to carry out their obligations."73 
Washington felt the burden of war, but the combatants and inhabitants of 
Nicaragua paid war's more brutal tolls.  Guerrilla warfare has historically 
precipitated the worst in behavior by its participants. Marines were implicated 
in, and in a few cases convicted of, a variety of war crimes. A few Marine 
officers were also connected to the brutal conduct of voluntarios, a short-lived 
Nicaraguan quasi-military force that was prone to executing prisoners and 49 
"bandit collaborators."74 Even Captain Chesty Lewis Puller, later on one of 
the most unreservedly respected Marines of all time, was the subject of such 
inquires.  In commenting on the nature of guerrilla warfare, Marine Major 
General Vernon E. Megee later wrote, "only the aggressive and ruthless may 
expect to survive  .  .  .  Puller and Lee [his second in command] were eminently 
qualified on both accounts." It is, nonetheless, important to note that a group 
of prominent residents from Puller's area of operations formally protested his 
eventual departure, claiming that he was, "one of the best officers due to his 
long experience in dealing with our difficult situation while fighting to obtain 
peace in Nicaragua." 
For his part, Sandino would also bear the burden of atrocities.  He 
reportedly killed "traitors" in his ranks and inspired allegiance to his cause 
through terror.  As Neill Macaulay points out, he ruthlessly demanded 
cooperation from all inhabitants in the zones in which he operated.  In 
reference to the use of cortes or cuts -the various techniques of machete 
torture and mutilation--Sandino remarked, "Liberty is not conquered with 
flowers  .  .  .  for this reason we must resort to the cortes of vest, gourd, and 
bloomers."7 
By the time of their departure from this tropical expedition, Marines would 
be well versed in the art of "small war." For all those inheriting this legacy, 
however, would come the task of determining whether or not these lessons 
were worth their costs. 50 
A Search for Doctrine 
The U.S. policy of assigning American military members to serve as 
Nicaraguan officials created challenging command problems and posed 
troubling ethical questions.  This situation was further complicated by an 
American colonial policing system lacking organizational structure, defined 
authority, and standardized procedures to carry out its responsibilities.  The 
military published volumes of institutional doctrine outlining the strategy, 
tactics, and techniques involved in combat operations. "Special Service" in 
the naval squadrons on station in Central America and the Caribbean, 
however, involved military expeditions that required  political  savvy and 
noncombat duties. This was not unique to the Nicaraguan intervention, but 
rather the rule in such interventions as evidenced in the published Marine 
Corps doctrine which stated: 
There are no defined principles of "Joint Action" between the State  
Department and the Navy Department by which the latter is to be  
restricted or guided, when its representatives become involved in  
situations calling for such operations.  In the absence of a clearly  
defined directive, the naval service has for guidance only certain  
general  principles  that  have been promulgated  through Navy  
Reg ulations.78  
This lack of formal guidance would not only complicate the attainment of 
national  objectives  but also increased the  potential  for abuses, both 
intentional or incidental, by those assigned to implement U.S. foreign policy. 51 
Devil Dogs as Diplomats 
Beyond the objective of establishing stability and order, Washington's 
guidance  in Nicaragua often lacked the clarity of definition needed for 
occupying forces to implement U.S. policy successfully.  Moreover, the 
military often lacked the institutional procedures and training needed to 
prepare them adequately for noncombat functions. This set of circumstances 
posed unique challenges to those in uniform on foreign shores.  This was 
especially the case for those temporarily assigned as officials of a foreign 
government.  Marine headquarters acknowledged the difficult position  in 
which this placed these officers, noting: 
Although he is under the supervision of the Chief Executive of the  
country in which he is operating, he is still a member of the naval  
service. In order that there may be some guide for the conduct of the  
relationship that is to exist between the Marine force commander and  
the Marine officer in charge of the native organization, fundamental  
principles should be promulgated by the Secretary of the Navy.79  
Unfortunately, there was often an absence, much less an understanding, of 
these essential  principles.  The relationship  that developed  between 
Ambassador Charles Eberhardt and General Fe land, the senior Marine 
commander in Nicaragua, served to illustrate this problem.  Ivan Musicant 
relates: 
Fe land's acquiescence to the voluntarios made public the already  
deep fissures within the American politico-military establishment in  
Managua.  Eberhardt saw the brigade commander as greatly  
overstepping his responsibilities, and called him Moncada's "virtual  
Minister of War and advisor on military and other matters."  And  
Fe land's support of the voluntarios  constituted  "a campaign of 
interference which has seriously damaged the  prestige  of the  52 
Legation, the Guardia, and the Marine Corps  itself and which 
threatens to jeopardize our whole Nicaraguan program."8° 
Warriors Supervising Elections 
Washington regularly assigned Marines, sailors, and soldiers to supervise 
Nicaraguan elections. This placed these warriors in a very precarious and 
politically sensitive position.  It was certainly far from an apolitical duty to be 
discharged by disinterested and neutral observers.  The Marines readily 
admitted this, concluding: 
To guarantee a "free and fair" election, the Electoral Mission should  
have the necessary authority over the executive, legislative, and  
judicial departments of the government to make effective its legal  
decisions. It must also have the active cooperation,  if not the actual  
control, of military and police forces sufficient to enforce its rulings.81  
Despite these challenges and temptations, Marines equitably supervised 
several elections, notably the presidential elections  of 1928 and 1932. 
Nonetheless, performing this function risked the appearance, if not the rise, of 
political manipulation. 
Soldier and Peace Officer 
Police and combat duties rarely share much in common in the tradition of 
American experience.  In Nicaragua, however, Marines were called upon to 
provide both.  Individuals performing police functions must necessarily 
involve themselves with the domestic affairs of a society--not a part of the 
American military tradition.  Perhaps more significant, Washington vested 
military officers with judicial  powers during the occupation.  Macaulay 53 
uncovered that, "In Jalapa Captain Carlson held court several nights a week, 
'acting as judge, jury, and prosecutor' in cases involving local citizens."82 With 
the U.S. military playing both the role of combatant and civil servant, it made it 
difficult for Americans and Nicaraguans alike  to  identify protector from 
occupier, citizen from enemy. With this policy, social boundaries, traditions, 
and principles became blurred. 
The Missionaries of the Constabulary 
Washington created the Guardia Nacional with the intent of providing 
Nicaragua with an  apolitical  force to  maintain  long-term  stability and 
constitutional order.  In Nicaragua and other Latin American countries, the 
Marines would  be  the  tool  Washington  used  to  create  such new 
constabularies. 
On December 22, 1927, an agreement was signed that put into force the 
Stimson-Moncado Pact's provision for a U.S.-led National Guard.  The 
December agreement outlined many duties and responsibilities that were, in 
many ways, divergent from those typically assigned to members of the U.S. 
military.  It read: 
The Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua shall be considered the sole  
military and police force of the Republic, clothed with full power to  
preserve domestic peace and the security of individual rights.  It shall  
have  control  of arms and ammunition,  military  supplies  and  
supervision of the traffic therein throughout the Republic.  It shall have  
control  of  all  fortifications,  barracks, buildings,  grounds, prisons,  
penitentiaries, vessels, and other government property which were  
formerly assigned to or under the control of the Army, Navy and Police  
Forces of the Republic.  It shall be subject only to the direction of the  
President of Nicaragua; all other officials desiring the services of the  
Guardia de Nacional de Nicaragua shall be required to submit  54 
requests through the nearest official of that organization. The Guard 
of Honor for the Palace of the President shall be a company of 
selected men and officers from the personnel  of the Guardia 
Nacional, and will wear distinctive insignia while employed on this 
service.83 
Rationalizing his reasons for appointing Marines to command and train the 
Guardia, Stimson asserted that, "Americans who, being members of our 
active military forces, had their future record to consider and were above local 
temptation.  .  .  .  Fortunately, several precedents for the success of such a 
constabulary exist in the Philippines and in Haiti."84 
Upon Coolidge's recommendation, President Diaz appointed Marine Colonel 
Elias Beadle as Director in Chief of the Guardia on May 12, 1927. 
Efforts to ensure the integrity of Marine leadership, however, did little to 
preserve the long-term health of this new "apolitical" institution. Ambassador 
Eberhardt argued that from the Guardia's very inception, Chamorro had 
cultivated its loyalty, and it was, "fast integrating into a politically controlled 
machine of the present regime."85  Local recruiting for the guardia was 
conducted by the local jefe politico, and involved mostly local Indians and 
supposed volunteers.86  Candidates for the Marine-administered  Military 
Academy in Managua, however, were chosen by President Moncada during 
his administration.87 
The political appointment of civilians to the higher ranks of the guardia 
also undercut both the organization's morale and discipline. When the U.S. 
withdrawal was looming over a new government still  fighting an active 
insurgency, many Nicaraguan officials urged a delay in turning over Marine 
control of the guardia. This handover, nonetheless, took place as scheduled 55 
on January 1, 1933.  Commenting on the state of the guardia upon the 
departure of the Marines, Whitney Perkins concludes: 
When command was turned over on January 1, 1933, it was not to a  
nonpolitical, professional force that might stand as guardian  for  
democratic procedures, but to an instrument for the seizure of power,  
controlled by men whose adherence to traditional goals and values  
was stronger than any indoctrination to disciplined restraint.8°  
Despite all the noble intentions, impressive energies, and vast resources 
invested in this American-imported institution,  it fell far short of fulfilling the 
hope that many Americans had placed in it. Few of these Americans realized 
that,  "The  republic's  political  tradition  of  deeply  nurtured  factional 
antagonisms militated against the creation of a truly nonpartisan military."89 
After U.S. forces departed Nicaragua, Sandino ended his  struggle, 
pledging allegiance to the Nicaraguan government, saying, "All  I want is that 
we should be given constitutional guarantees and that the Guard be 
constitutionalized."9° Demanding that the Guard fall under the jurisdiction of 
the very law it was created to enforce was not an entirely unreasonable 
request. Nonetheless, as this legacy unfolded, this would never be. 
A Retreat From Empire 
On December, 17, 1928, Undersecretary of State J. Reuben Clark 
published a memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine.  In it he argued that the 
original 1823 document proposed a U.S. policy aimed against European 
powers and that a Latin American state would be "the beneficiary of the 
Doctrine not its victim."91 This represented the beginning of a major shift in 56 
U.S. foreign policy in Latin America that would eventually lead to Franklin 
Roosevelt's era of the "good neighbor."  Hoover began directing the final 
steps in the liquidation of American Empire.92 On January 15, 1929, the U.S. 
ratified  the  Kellogg-Briand  Pact  of  Paris  which  outlined  a  general 
renunciation of war. Later this same year, Washington hosted a conference 
that formulated the inter-American treaties of conciliation and arbitration. 
Hoover would soon give the order to withdraw U.S. forces from Nicaragua 
and Haiti. 
Stimson continued to narrow the mission of the Marines, and in 1929 he 
announced his intention to withdrawal them, yet they would remain on duty in 
the troubled nation for three more years. After five-and-a-half years of limited 
results, the patience of the American public became exhausted. They now 
wanted their Marines ordered home. On April 18,1931, Secretary of State 
Stimson declared that the U.S. could no longer provide "general protection of 
Americans" in Nicaragua. Langley notes the significance of this statement, 
commenting: 
Simply interpreted, the statement of April 18 said that American  
residents in Nicaragua must look to Managua for protection, just as  
ordinary  Nicaraguans  did.  But  the  declaration  had deeper  
implications.  It signaled that the American military would no longer  
police the tropics.  It meant the U.S. would find a less forceful way of  
ensuring political stability in the Caribbean.  It marked the end of the  
banana wars.93  
Nicaraguans elected Liberal Dr. Juan Sacasa as president in American-
supervised elections on November 6, 1932.  Nine days later he named 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia as the first Nicaraguan jefe of the National Guard. 57 
The following day, the last remaining Marines boarded naval transports in 
Corinto and departed Nicaraguan soil. 
The Impact of Intervention 
By 1933, the human cost of the intervention included the lives of over one 
hundred Marines and over four thousand Nicaraguans.94 In February, 1934, 
Sandino negotiated a peace agreement with the Sacasa government, only to 
be assassinated by Somoza's guardia. The following year the U.S. Marines 
published their Small Wars Manual, while Smedley Butler published his 
scathing commentary on his exploits as a banana warrior. Within a year after 
the departure of the Marines, Somoza completed his corruption  of the 
guardia and, in 1936, used it to establish his repressive dynasty that reigned 
until 1979. 
The American occupation of Nicaragua not only affected the lives of 
citizens in this republic, but created a significant impact in the U.S.  In 1929, 
Harold Norman Denny, a journalist for the New York Times wrote the book, 
Dollars for Bullets, in which he began to criticize the intervention.  Denny, 
usually an ally of Washington, visited Nicaragua and wrote that the U.S. had 
often been "both hero and villain at once, as in its high-handed yet absolutely 
necessary, enforcement of American supervision of the last Nicaraguan 
election over the expressed will of the Nicaraguan Congress."95 Although he 
did not consider the Marines the tool of Wall Street, he nonetheless felt that 
the U.S. had gotten itself entangled in Nicaragua and, in the process, had 
trampled Nicaraguan sovereignty and protected suspect American business 58 
interests.  He concluded, "Few things  in  history have brought more 
condemnation on the U.S. than its career in Nicaragua."96 
The press was not the only critic of the intervention,  for there was 
substantial opposition in the U.S. Congress throughout this period.  Richard 
Mil lett in his book, Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S. Created 
Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family, points out the 
significant popular concern represented by Senator William Borah from 
Idaho, who led the American opposition to this intervention.  The senator 
vehemently attacked the policy stating, "the people of Nicaragua are being 
exploited in shameless fashion by American corporations protected by U.S. 
Marines."97  Mil lett also highlights Stimson's inability to gain funding from 
Congress to support the supervision of the 1932 Nicaraguan election, which 
led to the president's instructions to get the money from "other sources."98 
Creative financing strategies like this one foreshadowed a major element of 
the Iran-Contra scandal involving Nicaragua in the 1980s. 
Many Latin Americans also resented being subject to the intentions, noble 
or otherwise, of North Americans.  Argentinean author Gregorio Selser 
attempts to shed light on the Latin American perspective during this period in 
his book, Sandino: General of the Free. He counters that it was not good 
intentions, but arrogance, self-interests, and the desire to exploit, that drove 
the American intervention in Nicaragua. To illustrate this he relays the words 
of U.S. envoy, Lawrence Dennis, when he commented, "Here people often 
think we come to serve the interest of one lot against the other, but they're 
wrong. We only serve our own interests."99 Selser concludes with the irony of 59 
Franklin Roosevelt's comment that, "If  I had been a Latin American,  I too 
would have taken up arms against the intervention."" 
Latin  Americans,  in  particular,  admonished  their  North  American 
neighbors for the consequences of U.S. actions. Venezuelan General Rafael 
de Nogales observed the conditions from within Nicaragua at the time of the 
occupation and determined that the U.S. intervention was, "one which 
involves the future of eighty million  Latin Americans, with the forces of 
American imperialism arrayed on one side against the welfare of our twenty 
Latin American republics on the other."  In  his book, The Looting_ of 
Nicaragua, he condemned the history of U.S.-Latin American relations.  He 
argued that American lives and property were never in danger during the 
Nicaraguan crisis and made his plea for North Americans to look beyond the 
limits of their self-interest.1°1 
In 1967, Neill Macaulay, a guerrilla fighter turned historian, used his 
experience as a former lieutenant under Fidel Castro to help provide an 
insightful account of the "dirty little war" that the Marines fought against 
Sandino in his book The Sandino Affair. According to Macaulay, this was an 
impossible war fought for all the wrong reasons--"a war with no military 
solutions."1°2 Macaulay concludes: 
By the beginning of 1929 it was becoming more and more evident  
that the Marines in Nicaragua had been called upon to perform an  
almost impossible task.  .  .  .  They were expected to maintain order  .  .  .  
without any control over the civilian population.  .  .  .  Neither the people  
nor their officials stood behind the Marines in their attempt to put  
down lawlessness.  .  .  .  Notwithstanding all of their vigorous efforts,  
officers conducting the campaign were practically unanimous in the  
opinion that the military situation had reached a stalemate. So long  
as the people would not assist the Marines, the bandits could  60 
continue to operate in small groups and carry on their depredations in 
spite of everything the Marines could do.103 
Naive to the military de-escalation strategy necessary to defeat a guerrilla 
insurgency, Washington escalated the conflict until the Marines were viewed 
as occupying conquerors, instead  of liberating redeemers.  This error 
reinforced the negative image of the U.S.  in the eyes of many Latin 
Americans throughout the hemisphere. 
According to Macaulay, both parties in Nicaragua supported the intention 
and initial successes of the U.S. However, Sandino's pursuit of a "balance of 
reasonableness and terror" and the "aggressive and ruthless" mentality of the 
Marines produced a war of brutal cortes and savage air attacks.'°4  American 
proponents of this intervention were as frustrated in their attempts at securing 
their objectives in the halls of Congress as the Marines were in the mountains 
of Nicaragua.  U.S. policymakers were slow to appreciate Macaulay's 
observation that, "Latin Americans tend to prefer their own kind--no matter 
how perverse to the interfering foreigner--no matter how upright or well 
intentioned 
Even long-time advocates of American foreign policy admitted negative 
consequences of the intervention.  Historian turned statesman Dana G. 
Munro was a participant of this event and later disclosed both the merits of 
intent and disappointments in the results of the Nicaraguan intervention. 
Munro was the American chargé d'affaires during the intervention starting in 
1927.  Writing several articles and books that addressed this subject, he 
maintained that there had been a serious danger posed to American citizens 
at the time of the intervention and that both sides had determined that peace 61 
would not come to Nicaragua except by U.S. assistance.106 He went on to 
point out, however, that discussions in Congress made it clear that there was 
a large section of American public opinion against the policy of Nicaraguan 
intervention.  By 1950, Munro concluded that despite the merits of this 
intervention, it "aroused fear and distrust throughout Central America," and 
with regard to the U.S., represented "one of the most unfortunate episodes of 
its Caribbean policy."107 
Ambassador Matthew Hanna recognized that the American occupation of 
Nicaragua was "the principal excuse for [Sandino's] belligerency" and in 
effect admitted that the intervention was actually fomenting the bloodshed it 
was supposed to prevent.108 Bay len also concludes that, "the withdrawal of 
Marines was a tacit acknowledgment that the American intervention "tended 
to foment the evil which it was intended to cure."1°9 With the emergence of a 
new Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, Walter LaFeber would reassert this 
same argument thirty years later in his book Inevitable Revolutions.11° 
Although the Guardia, in name and organization, would last until the 1979 
Sandinista revolution, any hope that it would serve an apolitical function in 
Nicaraguan society quickly vanished with the departure of American troops. 
In 1968, the official U.S. Marine Corps history of this period would serve as a 
sobering epitaph for the intervention. In it Bernard Naltz wrote: 
Some estimate of this political failure may be gained from a glimpse 
at post-occupation Nicaragua. The American Marines and seamen 
killed  in action during the campaign left behind them two great 
monuments, the Guardia Nacional to maintain order and an electoral 
law to insure honest elections. Neither survived for long."' 62 
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4.  MILITARY GOVERNMENT:  
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1916-1924  
On May 7, 1916, Marine Captain 'Dopey' Wise told Juan Isidro Jimenez 
"The only thing for you to do is resign, if you don't want the help of the U.S." 
After contemplating this advice, the Dominican president stopped pacing and 
said, "Very well  .  .  .  I will sign my resignation in the morning." This, however, 
was not satisfactory to this Marine officer charged with coming to the aid of 
the troubled president; Wise responded, "You'll do no such damned thing  .  .  . 
you'll sign it right now."' 
This episode marked the opening of a new chapter in U.S. intervention in 
Latin America, the establishment of a military government and  an eight-year 
occupation of the Dominican Republic.  U.S. Military officers would expand 
their portfolio of expeditionary experience. In this republic, they would not be 
limited to fighting another "small war," but instead they would become the 
governors of a small republic. 
The U.S. had demonstrated a long history of interest in the eastern half of 
Hispaniola. As the U.S. extended its borders to the west, its naval forces also 
expanded. To achieve national security, Washington and the "new navy" 
charted a course for insular empire as a means for global military, political, 
and economic supremacy. This course was plotted through the waters of the 
Caribbean.  The security of the nation's underbelly and  its economic 
expansion required friendly neighbors.  In this plan, the Dominican Republic 
held strategic importance especially in providing port facilities, as an outpost 70 
against European penetration, and to preserve U.S. access to the Panama 
Canal. A national security doctrine was emerging in the U.S. that connected 
economic expansion and national security interests.  This is an interesting 
parallel to the Latin American military tradition of associating national security 
with economic development. 
Backdrop to Intervention 
In Washington, the Venezuelan crises of 1902-1903 caused a major fear 
of European penetration in the hemisphere. Germany led a European cry for 
Venezuela to meet the claims of their nationals and backed it by the threat of 
arms. German national interests in the Caribbean were growing, and foreign 
threats of intervention to collect debt payments continued to concerned U.S. 
policymakers.  These events combined with the demonstrated cycle of 
political turbulence in Central America and the Caribbean caused Theodore 
Roosevelt to completely reshape the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 into an 
instrument mandating direct U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of its 
neighbors to prevent the intrusion of European powers.  This "preventive 
intervention" provided a pattern for the expansive policy of increasing U.S. 
forays in Latin America. 
In 1905, the U.S. established a financial receivership in the Dominican 
Republic to preclude European intervention. U.S. foreign policy had evolved 
from isolation to imperialism.  U.S. expansion, however, brought increased 
conflicts between the interests of neighbors in the Americas.  This growing 
conflict would produce long-term friction  in diplomatic relations between 71 
North and South.  The U.S. would more times than not choose a military 
option to overcome this friction and implement foreign policy goals and 
objectives seeking to preserve growing national interests.  This heritage of 
intervention would establish the legacy of American prerogative in U.S.-Latin 
American relations. 
By the time of the 1916 Dominican intervention the Army and Navy had 
already gained experience in governing the citizens of foreign lands. The 
spoils of the Spanish American War included the fruits of empire: the Navy 
Department governed Samoa, Guam, and Wake; the U.S. military governed 
recently annexed Puerto Rico from 1898 to 1900 when an American civil 
governor took control; the American Army established a military government 
in Cuba under Generals John  R.  Brooke and Leonard Wood until 
independence was recognized on May 20, 1902. This withdrawal from Cuba 
surprised the world since the U.S. actually pulled out after the Cubans 
appeared able to rule themselves.2 
The new citizens of this growing American empire, however, did not 
always observe the wishes of their "benefactor" and sometimes needed 
disciplining.  In 1906, Theodore Roosevelt wrote: "I am so angry with that 
infernal little Cuban republic that I would like to wipe its people off the face of 
the earth.  All that we wanted from them was that they would behave 
themselves and be prosperous and happy so that we would not have to 
interfere."3 The Platt Amendment, drafted by Secretary of War Elihu Root and 
General Wood, was added as an appendix to the Cuban Constitution and 
incorporated into the 1903 Treaty between these two countries.  It stated: 72 
The United States may exercise the right  to  intervene  for the 
preservation  of  Cuban  independence,  the  maintenance  of  a 
government adequate  for  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and 
individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to 
Cuba imposed by the treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be 
undertaken by the government of Cuba.4 
This provided the U.S. justification for establishing a civil government in Cuba 
during 1906-1909 and for a later intervention in 1912. 
The U.S. also established military rule in the Philippines on December 21, 
1898. This annexation and subsequent military occupation inspired a fierce 
guerrilla war. Army General Arthur MacArthur served as military governor 
until replaced by a civil administration led by future president William Howard 
Taft on July 4, 1902.  For eight months in  1914, the Navy and Army 
established a military government in Mexico. These were short experiments 
with military colonial rule, and "the Army introduced American authority with a 
similar  display  of  the  better  qualities  of  turn-of-the-century  Western 
expansionism."5 Later military intervention would rarely be short in duration, 
creating long-lasting  effects, most of which were both unforeseen and 
undesired. 
On January 20, 1905, Washington brokered a protocol that arranged the 
establishment of a U.S. receivership of the Dominican Republic.  This was 
later ratified as a treaty in February, 1907.  From 1906 to 1911, General 
Ramon Caceres governed the republic with his Minister of Finance, General 
Horacio Velasquez.  Despite  his  generally enlightened  administration, 
President Caceres reaped the fate he had meted out to a previous president, 
as revolutionaries assassinated him on November 19, 1911.  Provisional 
President Eladio Victoria attempted to stem the tide of growing anarchy, 73 
funding his fight against rebel forces by increasing the national debt. The 
U.S. allowed him to overdraw from the collectorship, but by September, 1912, 
U.S. Minister William W. Russell recommended the seizure of Dominican 
custom houses, preferring the establishment of complete U.S. control of the 
republic to "ensure order and justice."6  Five days later Secretary of State 
Philander Knox dispatched two special commissioners and 750 Marines to 
investigate circumstances in the republic. Armed with these recent arrivals, 
Russell threatened to withhold customs revenues from Victoria unless he 
agreed to a government selected by the U.S.  This forced  the president's 
resignation.' 
After being unanimously elected by the Dominican Congress, Archbishop 
Adolfo Alejandro Nouel resigned on March 31, 1913. General Jose Bordas 
Valdez assumed the position of provisional president during an election 
supervised  by  the  U.S.  Revolutionary  turmoil,  however,  was  not 
extinguished.  In March, 1915, President Woodrow Wilson devised the 
"Wilson Plan," seeking the retirement of Bordas, the appointment of a 
provisional president whom the U.S. could support, and a new "free and fair" 
election of Congress and the president observed by U.S. officials.  Borda 
tried to remain in power beyond his term and on August 27, General Horacio 
Vasquez and Jimenez allowed the election of Dr. Ram On Baez rather than 
consent to a Wilson appointee.  Baez then allowed an election under U.S. 
supervision that elected Jimenez.8 On November 19, 1915, Russell, under 
instructions from the State Department, issued 'Russell's No. 14' proposing: 
U.S. control of all collections and expenditures; complete suppression of the 
army and militia; the establishment of a constabulary led by U.S. officers; 74 
reduction in the national budget; and revisions in revenues. Five days later 
Wilson wrote Jimenez attempting  to compel him to  realize  that,  "the 
substitution of a constabulary for the army, the custom-house guards, and the 
Guardia Republicana would make it impossible for local politicians to use 
force for the overthrow of constitutional authority." 
Meanwhile, Jimenez was fighting for his survival against one of these 
"local politicians." He was moving against insubordinate military officers and 
their leader General Desiderio Arias, his minister of war. At the same time, 
many members of the Dominican Congress felt Jimenez was in  secret 
collusion with the U.S. With a sizable number of senators supporting Arias, 
the Dominican Congress initiated impeachment proceedings on May 1, 1916, 
while the General went into open rebellion, seizing control of the capita1.1° 
Repeatedly declining Washington's offer of troops, Jimenez insisted that all 
he needed was arms for his remaining loyal troops.11  Three days later, 
Marine Captain Frederick M. Wise landed his one hundred fifty Marines in 
Santo Domingo with orders to "support the President and have entire charge 
of the work ashore."12 
By May 15, Marines seized control of Santo Domingo.  Initially charged 
with the protection of the U.S. legation and the Dominican president, these 
Marines now prepared to mount an offensive against General Arias's army. 
By landing troops, the U.S. circumvented the nation's  political  process, 
creating a vacuum of power in the Dominican government. With U.S. troops 
now occupying the  capital,  Russell threatened  to establish  a military 
government if Dominican cabinet members resigned in the face of growing 
U.S. pressures for concessions.13 Rear Admiral W. B. Caperton, the overall 75 
commander of U.S. military forces in Hispaniola, took charge of the situation. 
As he had done in  Haiti  during  the previous year, Caperton began 
interviewing  prospective  presidential  candidates,  using  Russell  as an 
interpreter.'4 Since Caperton concluded that Arias was the primary source of 
political and military opposition to the occupation, the admiral seized the 
initiative and deployed his forces to attack the general.15 
During the first days of June, Marines and sailors began occupying the 
northern towns of Monte Cristi and Puerto Plata in preparation for an attack 
on Arias's stronghold at Santiago.  Colonel Joseph Pendleton faced minor 
resistance, and the superior fire power of his Marines allowed U.S. forces 
quickly to gain control  of the north, seizing Santiago with only minor 
casualties.16 With Arias's military power neutralized, occupation authorities 
redoubled their efforts to create a new Dominican government. 
When the Dominican congress appeared ready to elect the Chief 
Supreme Court Justice Federico Henriquez y Carvajal as the new president, 
the American Minister once again intervened. Russell had previously labeled 
Henriquez as an 'Arias man' because of his popularity among pro-Arias 
senators. Moreover, when Henriquez would not guarantee to initiate U.S. 
sponsored reforms if elected, the U.S. considered him an unacceptable 
candidate. Together with a member of the Council of Ministers and the future 
Military Governor, Navy Captain Harry Knapp, Russell engineered a plan to 
have pro-Henriquez senators arrested before the final vote. The U.S. now 
demanded prior approval of all presidential candidates.  In defiance, the 
Dominican congress elected Federico Henriquez's highly respected brother, 
Dr. Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, as interim president.17 Caperton's relief, 76 
Rear Admiral Charles Pond, would later comment on the honesty of this 
Nicaraguan physician and diplomat.18 
Frustrated in its efforts to shape Dominican political decisions, the U.S. 
now resorted to applying financial pressure.  Because of the receivership 
established  in 1905, the U.S. controlled a major portion  of Dominican 
revenues. On August 18, however, American officials refused to give the 
government any of these monies until it met their demands, in particular, the 
financial  control  of the country and the establishment  of  a  U.S.-led 
constabulary. Despite the economic hardships this placed on the Dominican 
people, it failed to have the desired result.  Since no Dominican executive 
could weather the storm created by such comprehensive concessions to 
national sovereignty, the situation reached an impasse.  Nonetheless, as 
Musicant notes,  a permanent administration would soon be elected.  This 
placed Washington at a decision point. 
In 1913, President Wilson had laid out his "New Latin American Policy," 
and stated, "The future, ladies and gentlemen, is going to be very different." 
Wilson's actions, however, would prove otherwise,  for instead  of "an 
emancipation from subordination,"  Latin  Americans  in  the Dominican 
Republic would receive a U.S.-imposed military government.19 With General 
Arias appearing poised for the presidency in the upcoming congressional 
election,  "Russell and the State Department's Latin American Division 
advocated unilaterally dismantling the republic's political infrastructure and 
establishing a formal U.S. military government.2° Secretary Lansing, viewing 
preemptive action by the U.S. necessary to prevent revolution and economic 
disaster, recommended the immediate establishment of martial law. Wilson, 77 
on this advice, concluded, "with the deepest reluctance  .  .  .  I am convinced 
this is the least of evils in sight of this very perplexing situation."21 
On November 26, 1917, the Secretary  of the Navy drafted a  bill 
authorizing officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps to serve 
under the Dominican government in order "to carry out terms of the [1907] 
convention and the plans of the respective governments thereunder."22 
Captain Harry S. Knapp, commander of the Navy's Atlantic Cruiser Force, 
proclaimed military government on November 29.  Unwilling to serve under 
this military government, interim  President Henriquez departed for self-
imposed exile in Cuba ten days later. 
Although the lower echelons of the government bureaucracy remained 
staffed by Dominicans, cabinet members refused Knapp's offer to remain in 
their jobs without pay or official recognition.23 When faced with the potential 
reconvening of another problematic national assembly, the Naval officer 
resolved the problem by suspending the body.24 On January 2, 1917, Military 
Governor Knapp suspended the Dominican congress. The development of 
these events is notable, considering Washington's overall lack of guidance of 
officials in the republic. With an American foreign policy yet defined, the U.S. 
had, nonetheless, decisively shaped the political economy of one of its 
sovereign neighbors. As historian Bruce Calder points out, the U.S. had in 
just over a month "eliminated two of the three branches of representative, 
democratic government."25 78 
Early Phases of Military Government  
Knapp cited Article III of the 1907 Treaty as the legal basis for the U.S. 
intervention.  Washington proclaimed that the increase in national debt 
created by the Dominican government's efforts to fight revolution  was in 
violation of this agreement.  Knapp tried to assure Dominicans that the 
occupation was only a temporary measure for their own benefit and that the 
U.S. would withdraw "when the affairs of the country could be carried  on 
without violence and corruption."26  After disarming the population and 
imposing  strict censorship on the press, Knapp quickly resumed the 
operation of the customs receivership. 
The Problem of Policy 
From the outset of this intervention, the military was given great latitude in 
the performance of its duties.  As Allan R. Mil lett points out, "the State 
Department asked the Navy to take full control of the country while  it 
negotiated for a compliant new regime."27 When Washington failed to find a 
suitably compliant government, the U.S. military became the "new regime" by 
default.  In a similar fashion, with the absence of a policy from Washington, 
the military government's actions became U.S. policy by default.  In many 
ways, the establishment of this military government stunted the development 
of a clear U.S. Dominican policy, since there no longer existed the need for 
Washington to solicit the cooperation of a foreign government to attain its 
foreign policy objectives.  Unfortunately, this condition would plague both 79 
Dominicans and their American occupiers for the duration of this diplomatic 
interlude. 
The blatant lack of policy was apparent from the earliest stages of the 
intervention.  Instead of a policy, Washington had merely reacted to the 
turmoil in the Dominican Republic.  Upon hearing of the disturbances in 
Santo Domingo, Lansing had vested Russell and Caperton with the authority 
to "take whatever actions they thought appropriate."28  In response, Colonel 
Waller, "Haiti's real ruler,"29 dispatched Captain Wise telling him only that, 
"there's a little trouble over in San Domingo [sic].  .  .  .  It will probably be settled 
in a short time." Admiral Caperton, added little detail to this observation when 
he later briefed the Captain. When U.S. minister Russell finally related the 
conclusion of the State Department to Wise, it distilled down to "They've 
decided that these revolutions have got to cease."3°  Moreover, the great 
latitude given to this junior Marine officer did not demonstrate a deliberate 
plan for military intervention, much less provide convincing evidence of a 
defined U.S. foreign policy. 
Even while prospecting for a presidential candidate to install, Admiral 
Caperton wondered what future  Dominican  policy would  be.31  The 
establishment of a U.S. military government had been contemplated, yet the 
mandate, vision, and agenda of such a government had not.  Without a 
clearly defined policy, the U.S. agenda in this republic evolved in reaction to 
events and escalated to measures of greater control. Furthermore, without a 
deliberate policy for occupation, it was hard to know when the job was done 
or when it was time to go home. 80 
With the landing of Marines, Washington assumed the authority to govern 
but did not assume the responsibilities commensurate with the stewardship of 
a nation's people.  Instead, Washington  largely delegated  this grave 
responsibility to those trained to wage war.  This approach had detrimental 
effects on both the governing and the governed.  Marine Colonel George 
Thorpe related, "It would [have been] a fine thing if troops in the Dominican 
Republic and Haiti [had been] told exactly what their mission [was]  .  .  .  Men 
can face a very black future if they but know what it is."32 
The absence of a defined Dominican policy from Washington required 
members of the U.S. military occupation to define and implement the civil and 
political responsibilities of government in the republic.  With little guidance 
from Washington, the American policy in the Dominican Republic in 1917 
was the product of Military Governor Knapp and his advisors,  Minister 
Russell, and to a lesser degree, Clarence H. Baxter, the head of the 
receivership.  They did, however, seek the advice of prominent Americans 
and Dominicans.33 
The Program 
In 1916, the dominant view of the Dominican leadership was that the 
American occupation would be short, only long enough to guarantee free 
elections as outlined in the first Wilson Plan.34  They were wrong.  Very 
rapidly, the military began to initiate a comprehensive program of reforms 
throughout the republic. Both Washington and its officials in the republic felt 
that in order to fight perennial political violence and social turmoil, measures 81 
that focused on promoting stability and economic development were vital to 
the reform of this "backward" nation. Consequently, the military concentrated 
most of its efforts and limited resources on reforming the Dominican systems 
of education, public health, sanitation, public works, and the establishment of 
an efficient and apolitical constabulary.35 
The Guerrilla War 
Almost immediately after the landing of Marines, Dominicans began to 
resist the occupation.  Eventually, this resistance grew into an insurgency 
against the military government. As Musicant and others reveal, however, the 
Marines proved ill prepared for the brutality and debilitating effects of this 
"small war," even though they had seen similar service in  Haiti.  After 
enjoying a brief honeymoon, the military government fought a five-and-a-half-
year guerrilla war in the east. Beginning in 1917, military authorities pursued 
a strategy of escalation.  In  many ways,  this  represented  a grave 
misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict.  It would take the Marines and 
their supporters a long time to appreciate the myriad of factors driving the 
guerrilla movement--that it was not merely a campaign by "gavilleros,"  self-
serving bandits. 
Although the Marines officially formed the new constabulary, the Guardia 
Nacional Dominicana, in April, 1917, by necessity, they quickly became  more 
involved in fighting the guerrilla war than in training the new national police 
force. By early 1919, military officials considered the eastern situation out of 
control and tripled the Marine forces deployed in these provinces.  Frustrated 82 
in their efforts to defeat the guerrillas and suffering from growing casualties, 
Marine commanders offered bounties for rebel leaders dead or  alive. 
Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton, now the acting Dominican minister of war, said 
of a rebel band, "every member of the band richly deserves death for his 
crimes."36 And Governor Knapp agreed. Although few courts of law came to 
the same conclusion, insurgents consistently received what appeared to 
Dominicans as excessively harsh sentences. More importantly, severe court 
sentences and documented abuses by some members of the military often 
fueled the rebel cause. Reaping marginal results, military operations against 
guerrillas began to bog down.  With little formal training and experience in 
counter-insurgency, and found wanting in leadership and resources, Marines 
and their tactics "did  little  to crush the war and much to create new 
guerrillas."37 
There were many reasons to explain this gap between intentions and 
outcomes. Before this intervention, these Marines, like most Americans, had 
very little understanding of the land and people of the Dominican Republic. 
Furthermore, they had  little  training or experience  in  guerrilla warfare. 
Deployed Marine forces were further handicapped initially by a shortage of 
leadership that resulted from U.S. involvement in the First World War. The 
lack of discipline and isolated criminal acts of Marine forces during the 
conduct of this war reflected symptoms of a larger problem--the decision to 
use ill-prepared fighters to accomplish a mission yet to be defined.  This 
decision had detrimental repercussions for Americans and Dominicans alike. 
Marines developed their "small wars" doctrine of counter-insurgency 
through the painful lessons of experience.38  In 1918, Marines started using 83 
the new technique of reconcentraciones, or concentrations--the herding of 
people from a district into a few large centers.  Only the plan's originator, 
Lieutenant Colonel Thorpe, believed this approach to be a success. Calder 
believes the use of this strategy illustrated the Marines' inability to understand 
the enemy. In describing the failure of the reconcentraciones, Calder notes: 
It was impossible to separate the insurgents from the pacificos 
because no clear line divided them. Though the concentrations might 
have isolated  active  insurgents  from  their  bases  of  supplies, 
intelligence, and fresh manpower, the benefit was lost when the 
concentrations lasted for only a limited time and covered restricted 
territory. Nor did the strategy solve the basic problem of forcing the 
guerrillas to confront the Marines--the guerrilla either remained quiet 
or went off to relieve unprotected areas of arms, ammunition, other 
supplies, and money.39 
In addition to causing more resentment and animosity among Dominicans 
because of these relocations, another unfortunate result of this strategy was 
that Marines began to regard all Dominicans as the enemy. 
By 1920, however, this policy of containment appeared to be working 
better. The Guardia, local police, and guardias campestres or rural guards 
were  assisting  the  Marines  in  the  battle  against  the  insurgents.4° 
Nonetheless, despite the successes of these forces, they remained limited in 
resources and effectiveness, and the owners of sugar company estates 
began to revert back to the old system of paying off the guerrilla leaders in 
return for protection.  Appreciating the merit of the resulting stability and 
order, the military government tacitly agreed to this spirit of accommodation.41 
The situation in the east, however, once again deteriorated  in 1921. 
Unable to achieve their military objective of destroying the guerrilla force, 
military officials adopted two new war strategies in the spring of 1922. The 84 
government implemented a policy of amnesty and created civilian, pro-
military government guerrilla units (civil guards) to search out and destroy the 
"gavilleros."  Marine brigade commander General Harry Lee implemented 
these programs, and they quickly produced the desired results.  Armed 
opposition to the military government ended in May, 1922. Calder believes 
the appearance of Military Governor Robinson and General Lee decisively 
contributed to the end of the guerrilla war because of their willingness to 
reexamine the nature of the conflict. They listened to advisors and grasped 
the political and economic grievances of the guerrilla movement.42 
The Merging of the Military and the Political 
As the "new navy" expanded its role, its officers grew more confident in 
defining national interests and expressing opinions concerning how the U.S. 
could best effect its foreign policy goals.  During Theodore Roosevelt's 
administration, the commander of the Caribbean Squadron told Secretary of 
State Hay that the Dominican Republic, "would never feel the need for 
effective self-government until a foreign power seized the customs houses 
and the republic experienced a taste of domination."43 By 1915 this political 
commentary by military officers evolved into political activism abroad under 
the U.S. flag.  Naval officers, as "sailor-diplomats," gained experience in 
affairs at the edge of the American empire and subsequently achieved 
growing autonomy in the performance of their duties.44 
Because  of  their  extensive  travel  experience,  Washington  often 
considered these officers as the local country "expert" on the scene, giving 85 
them great latitude in their conduct on foreign shores. The U.S. intervention 
in the Dominican Republic would demonstrate that policymakers did not limit 
the competency of these officers to strictly those areas with obvious military 
application. Instead, Washington consistently assigned these military leaders 
missions of social, economic, and political significance. Naval officers had a 
history of making policy in the Dominican Republic, for on two occasions the 
president  and  State  Department  appointed  Navy Commander  A.C. 
Dillingham as one of the two officers to handle relations with the republic and 
work out the details of the customs receivership.45 
From early 1917 to late 1920, the State Department left most of the control 
of the occupation to the Department of the Navy. With the U.S. declaration of 
war with Germany four months after the establishment of military government 
in the republic, Knapp's administration would have a free hand to design and 
implement U.S. policy.'6  The admiral assigned Marines to key political 
positions,  including  the two most important  posts  in  the Dominican 
government.  In addition to his duties as Second Brigade commander, 
Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton became the Minister of War, Navy, Interior, and 
Police. Colonel Rufus F. Lane assumed the position of Minister of Foreign 
Relations, Justice, and Public Instruction.  Navy officers supervised public 
works and agriculture. Marine civil engineers administered the public works 
programs, while Navy doctors implemented the nation's public sanitation and 
health reform.  Marines also established and trained a new national 
constabulary to replace the army and police.47 
With Dominican posts vacated, eliminated, or assigned to U.S. military 
officers, Washington effectively transferred all of this republic's state powers 86 
to U.S. military commanders trained to accomplish aggressively assigned 
missions. These officers assumed responsibility for virtually all civil functions 
of government.48 Although the abrupt departure of the Dominican president 
and his associates originally irritated Knapp, ultimately it proved fortuitous for 
Knapp's governmental reorganization and consolidation of power and made 
his decision to suspend elections for the national assembly easier.49  The 
establishment of military government also created conditions that gave local 
Marine commanders increased authority.  As Lieutenant Colonel Miller, a 
member of General Lee's staff when he was Military Governor, wrote, "The 
varied  character  of  duty  performed  by  the  regimental  commander, 
accompanied by a wide scope of jurisdiction and influence, clothed him with 
more than ordinary authority."50 
Although most of the American officers had  little  formal training  or 
experience to equip them to perform these civil functions, they soon not only 
grew comfortable in discharging these duties but began to feel that they were 
uniquely qualified to perform them.  This phenomenon, combined with the 
moral  missionary zeal and  racial  prejudices  that many U.S.  officials 
embraced, produced an attitude within the military government that it was the 
rightful steward of the fledgling republic. Admiral Knapp told Secretary of the 
Navy Josephus Daniels that the "only hope of those negroes is wise white 
guidance .  .  .; it would be fatal to turn the gov[ernment] over to the negroes, as 
fatal or worse than [it was]to turn the South over to the negroes after the [civil] 
war."51  Moreover, the  military government did  not  limit  itself  to  the 
administration of domestic obligations, but also controlled the republic's 
foreign policy, supervising the "diplomatic and consular representatives of the 87 
government sent to foreign  countries, and  it  received  the  diplomatic 
representatives of other countries."52 
In November, 1918, Marine Brigadier General B. H. Fuller briefly replaced 
Admiral Knapp as military governor, until Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden 
assumed this post in February, 1919. Snowden continued the government's 
tradition of American arrogance, yet lacked Knapp's desire to solicit the 
advice of the Dominican people.  It would not be until late in 1920 that the 
State Department reasserted its control over Dominican policy. This was due 
largely to the growing international  perception  of the oppressive and 
ineffective conduct of this military government.53 
A Call for Withdrawal 
Without definitive guidance from Washington, knowledge of Dominican 
affairs, and experience in the art of government, the odds were stacked 
against the military administration.  Without these prerequisites,  it was 
fundamentally impaired  in  effecting  significant, much less  long-lasting 
initiatives.  Despite the military government's genuine efforts to improve the 
quality of life for Dominicans and to promote a more prosperous future for this 
republic,  it  ran into significant obstacles.  Snowden neither desired to 
embrace Dominican culture nor wished to initiate an engaged dialogue with 
Dominicans in regards to their future. Since he did not solicit native advice, 
he did not promote a sense of Dominican ownership of American-sponsored 
reforms. 88 
Many  of  the  difficulties  that  occupation  authorities  encountered 
represented  the  inherent  barriers  of  language,  racism,  and  cultural 
differences.  The  military  also  lacked  training,  resources,  and  the 
understanding  needed  to  implement  its  reforms.  Most  importantly, 
Washington and the military insisted on importing American institutions and 
principles that simply did not work in the context of Dominican realities.54 
In addition to the character of the military government, factors within the 
republic provided impediments to Washington's agenda. The distractions of 
fighting  a guerrilla  war, effects of the post-war depression,  and the 
emergence of an effective nationalist movement represented some of the 
greatest challenges  to  military  rule.  The inherent  problems  of  the 
government,  conditions  within  Dominican  society,  and  public  and 
international  attention combined  to provide  the  catalyst  for  the  U.S. 
administration to reevaluate its Dominican policy.  The political costs of 
military government now began to exceed its benefits. 
After four years of occupation, the military government established by the 
U.S. held  little  credibility as a "temporary measure" on behalf  of the 
Dominican people.  In 1916, President Wilson proclaimed, "The States of 
America have not been certain what the United States would do with her 
power. That doubt must be removed."55 By 1920, little doubt remained in the 
minds of most Dominicans.  The Dominican nationalists and other anti-
imperialists mobilized international public opinion to bring pressure on the 
U.S.  It was not until Washington faced the challenges of extricating itself from 
intervention, that it began to formulate and articulate a deliberate foreign 
policy that defined American interests and objectives in this republic.  U.S. 89 
policy would take form in a plan for withdrawal. Washington drafted its first 
withdrawal plan on December 23, 1920.  Unfortunately, the introduction of 
this "Wilson Plan," in combination with the devastating effect of the post-war 
depression, undercut needed support for the military government's reform 
programs. With these events, "the creative work of the military government 
came to a virtual halt."66 
Sumner Welles, the pioneer of Franklin D. Roosevelt's future "Good 
Neighbor policy," wrote the Wilson Plan. Although he consulted with ousted 
Dominican executive Dr. Henriquez and distinguished Dominican writer and 
diplomat Tulio  Cestero, the plan  called  for  continued  restrictions on 
Dominican sovereignty. The proposal recommended that  a single agency 
coordinate a U.S. civil administration that would eventually withdraw, yet it 
outlined a protocol similar to the Platt Amendment.  It appeared not to be a 
plan to withdraw from this republic as much as it represented  a withdrawal 
from Welles's longstanding advocacy of Dominican sovereignty.  For in 
arguing against President Ulysses S. Grant's efforts to annex the republic in 
1870 Welles stated: 
Our duty is plain as the Ten Commandments. Kindness, beneficence, 
assistance,  aid,  help,  protection,  all  that  is  implied  in  good
neighborhood, these we must give,  freely,  bountifully  but their 
independence is as precious to them as is ours to us, and it is placed 
under the safeguard of natural laws which we cannot violate with 
impunity.58 
In effect, the Wilson Plan imposed a landlord on this "neighborhood." The 
precious nature of the independence mentioned, however, proved strong 
enough to override  the  landlord,  for  not even moderate Dominican 90 
nationalists could accept a plan that so restricted the future sovereignty of the 
country. 
By the end of 1919, the State Department forced Snowden to appoint a 
junta consultiva or consulting commission of four influential Dominicans to 
explore policies and plans to facilitate an eventual U.S. withdrawal. Although 
he appointed this commission, Snowden refused to implement the junta 
consultiva's proposals, specifically in the areas of censorship and the provost 
courts, the  military  tribunals  established  to adjudicate  matters directly 
affecting the military government and its personnel.  These courts had 
jurisdiction over American and Dominican civilians and military personnel. 
Dominicans continued to chafe under the censorship laws, and the provost 
courts "gained the reputation of being unjust, oppressive and cruel, and 
seem[ed] to delight in excessive sentences."59  On January 7, 1920, the 
members of the junta consultiva  resigned.60  Since incoming President 
Warren G. Harding had promised  to withdraw the Marines from the 
Dominican Republic if elected, an oppressive U.S. military government could 
not be long endured if the administration was to maintain any measure of 
credibility.61 
In an attempt to extricate the U.S. from this increasingly untenable 
position, Harding appointed Sumner Welles as special commissioner to the 
Dominican Republic to mediate a plan for withdrawal. Welles would become 
a key advisor in U.S. policy matters in Central America during the era of the 
"good neighbor" after 1933.62 In reference to the more conciliatory approach 
of policymakers during the Harding-Coolidge era, Bailey concludes that, 91 
"Santo Domingo, perhaps the ugliest example of Yankee dictatorship, 
benefited from this more enlightened policy."63 
In  his new capacity, Welles promoted the supremacy of the State 
Department in implementing U.S. policy.64 Because of his efforts, by May, 
1921, the State Department established itself as the authority for policy in the 
republic,  effectively removing the  military government from  control  of 
Dominican  affairs  until  the  eventual  establishment  of  the  provisional 
Dominican government.66 After this period, the military would play a much 
smaller role in the development and implementation of foreign policy in this 
entire region.  A man with a mission, Welles continued to mediate a 
withdrawal plan acceptable to the Dominicans.  Under the instructions of 
Secretary of State Hughes, the new governor, Admiral Samuel S. Robinson, 
announced the Harding Plan on June 14, 1921, yet Dominicans still refused 
to concede.  In particular, nationalists opposed elections conducted under 
occupation, the ratification  of the acts of the military government, any 
extension of the general receiver's power, and an American-organized 
national constabulary.66 
Although Washington had decided to withdraw, it had not attended to the 
readiness of the Guardia--a previously articulated prerequisite for American 
departure.  In an attempt to rectify this problem, in August Washington sent 
General Harry Lee to command the Marine brigade deployed in the republic 
and to organize the Guardia.  Upon reaching  his new command Lee 
concluded that in regards to this constabulary, "Officers and men were 
without training  .  .  .  their value as a military force was nil."67 The challenges 
confronting Lee and his Marines were further silhouetted with the kidnapping 92 
of Thomas J. Steele, a British citizen and manager of the La Angilina sugar 
estate.  This move by the prominent guerrilla leader Ramon Natera finally 
exposed to Marine commanders the political nature of the guerrilla struggle.68 
It was this political aspect of the struggle that further reinforced in the minds of 
many Americans the critical need for a professional, apolitical constabulary to 
protect and serve the nation in a future independent republic. By 1922, many 
U.S. diplomatic officials had come to the conclusion that such a constabulary 
was "an important step in the general work of cleaning up Central America."69 
In March, 1922, Francisco Peynado traveled to Washington to broker  a 
new plan for U.S. withdrawal. Peynado, a prominent Dominican attorney with 
strong ties to U.S. sugar corporations, was a former cabinet official and 
representative of the Dominican government in Washington.  He believed 
that the military government was incapable  of negotiating a settlement 
because it did not understand the Dominican people. He also concluded that 
the pura y simple, the no-compromise position of the radical nationalists,  was 
politically unrealistic.7°  After effectively lobbying the U.S. Congress and 
gaining the support of Washington, Peynado joined Welles and U.S. officials 
in soliciting the support for this new plan from the Dominican leadership. 
After achieving  this, the final  draft of the Hughes-Peynado Agreement 
appeared in Dominican papers on September 23, 1922.71 
Although  this  agreement  required  the  ratification  of  certain  laws, 
completion of several public works projects, and faithful compliance to a loan 
arrangement previously negotiated by the military government, it represented 
a substantial departure from earlier U.S. evacuation proposals.  The new 
plan eliminated the military mission and a financial "advisor."  It also provided 93 
protection against possible U.S. control of Dominican finances and stipulated 
the establishment of a provisional Dominican government to oversee the 
implementation of pre-withdrawal conditions.72 
The split between the military government and the State Department 
continued to grow. Since the new plan called for a complete U.S. withdrawal, 
the State Department directed the organization  of the Guardia to be 
expedited in mid-1922. To no avail, Robinson and Lee expressed "vehement 
objections" to a plan that gave them but "a few months to accomplish what 
they had planned to accomplish in years.'  Neither the governor nor the 
general felt this provided the time necessary to train an adequate force.74 This 
sentiment also appeared in the later writings of Marine participants.  In 
response to Dominican requests for Marine instructors to continue training 
their policia, some of these officers felt that, "the conditions to be proposed by 
the Dominican government will not make it possible for any American officers 
to accept or continue a duty whose success is far from being assured."75 
Nonetheless, by September, 1922, Welles and a Dominican commission 
agreed upon initial steps for the transition to Dominican rule, giving the 
Guardia the new name of Policia Nacional Dominicana and appointing 
caudillo governor Buenaventura Cabral as its commander. On October 1, 
Dominican representatives elected Juan Bautista Vicini Burgos and a cabinet 
to head the provisional government.  Three weeks later this provisional 
government took control of the republic.  Governor Robinson and his staff 
departed the same day, leaving General Lee as the military governor. 
Lee quickly established his priorities: (1) develop the policia; (2) promote 
good relations with the Dominican people by insisting on exemplary behavior 94 
by the police and Marines; and (3) keep order.76 He immediately intensified 
and accelerated the policia curriculum at the training center at Haina. The 
Dominican government, impressed with the Haina program, invited the 
Marine  instructors  to stay beyond the time  for American withdrawal. 
According to Millen, however, these Marines declined the offer anticipating 
the loss of their autonomy and a politicization of the policia.7 
On March 15, 1924, the Alianza Party won an overwhelming victory in 
Dominican elections and on July 12, President Horacio Vasquez assumed 
the presidency. On September 18, the last Marine departed, the final symbol 
of colonial government in the Dominican Republic. 
The Impact of Intervention 
For two years Admiral Knapp governed a nation which he never knew the 
name of, constantly referring to his domain as the "Republic of Santo 
Domingo:178  This  epitomized  American  detachment,  ignorance,  and 
insensitivity to Dominican  realities.  More importantly,  it  represented a 
symptom of a deeper, more significant problem--the assumption of authority 
void of accountability. The initial stages of the Dominican crisis of 1916 and 
the subsequent U.S. intervention did not receive the State Department's, 
much less the president's, serious attention.  In fact, it did not even require a 
formal policy--only military intervention. Furthermore, when Minister Russell 
and the State Department recommended dismantling the republic's political 
infrastructure and establishing a formal U.S. military government, they 95 
initiated a policy that they themselves did not assume responsibility for 
implementing. 
By making military officials the primary agents of U.S. policy, Washington 
transferred its responsibilities to actors ill equipped to carry them out.  In the 
process, it undermined its own efforts and objectives. During this early period 
in the Dominican Republic, the military was not only the tool, but often the 
architect of U.S. foreign policy--a role  it was not prepared for.  Without 
substantive guidance from Washington, the Military's bureaucratic programs 
of national development became U.S. policy by default. When Washington 
finally defined  its Dominican policy, any long-term benefits that  it might 
promise were handicapped by the politics of an expeditious withdrawal. 
The military government did institute many positive programs during its 
administration, notably Colonel Lane's reforms in education, the successful 
public  works  and  modernization  projects  like  the  highway  and 
communication systems, and attempts to protect the Dominican economy 
from foreign penetration. The lack of other substantial and long-term reforms, 
however, did not necessarily represent a deficiency in the government's 
willingness or talent, as much as it demonstrated what Calder relates to  as 
the difficulty any foreign government will have producing "changes, however 
useful or necessary, in another country.'" 
By failing to define policy and provide guidance or supervision during the 
beginning phases of this occupation, Washington further complicated the 
problematic nature of reform by fiat.  It placed its military members in a 
precarious position  requiring  political  activism and social engineering--
tragically similar to approaches used by later military regimes throughout 96 
Latin America. By acts of commission and omission, Washington transformed 
the role of many military officers into one more political than military in nature. 
This was another chapter in Washington's abandonment of American military 
tradition outside the nation's borders. 
Although the U.S. successfully extricated itself from this island republic, it 
was less successful in reversing the unintended, often irreversible, results of 
the intervention. At times, military occupation aggravated the very conditions 
it was attempting to improve. Ambassador Russell's early decision to halt 
payments from the treasury to pressure Dominican officials during the outset 
of the occupation brought increased economic hardship on Dominicans and 
did little to assist Marines attempting to quell resistance and civil unrest.8° 
Conditions within the Dominican Republic and the actions of U.S. officials 
often combined to produce policies that were not only unintended but 
contrary to the government's objectives.  This was the case regarding land 
reform that was designed with the intention  of distributing  land more 
equitably.  It did not.  Instead, government legislation  facilitated further 
exploitation  by sugar  companies.  As  this  instance  illustrates,  the 
implementation of policy often conflicted with stated policy goals.  Perhaps 
there is no better example of this than Washington's policy of intervention 
itself.  It  professed the exportation  of democracy through a  six-year 
dictatorship.8' 
In a troubling indictment of the Dominican intervention, Horace Knowles, 
ex-minister of the U.S. to the Dominican Republic and Bolivia, summarized 
the infractions of the U.S. military government during this period, charging: 97 
(1) there was no legal basis for the intervention; (2) the 1916 invasion 
was in violation of the U.S. Constitution, existing U.S.-Dominican 
treaties, international law, the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine  as 
defined by the U.S. government, the fourteenth of Woodrow Wilson's 
Fourteen Points, and a U.S. sponsored resolution adopted at the 
Third Conference of the Hague Tribunal;  (3) "excesses, abuses, 
cruelties and murders" had been committed by the U.S. Marines; (4) 
various orders of the military government were "unreasonable, cruel, 
and totally un-American"; (5) both private and corporate rights and 
property had been violated and damaged by the military government 
and its agents, resulting  in various losses; and (6) the military 
government had been "incompetent, wasteful and extravagant."82 
Moreover, whatever good intentions and positive characteristics the 
military government may have had were canceled out by the facilitating role it 
inadvertently played in the future of a Guardia officer by the  name of Rafael 
Leonidas Trujillo Molina.  Generalissimo Trujillo would eventually use the 
Marine-trained Guardia Nacional to maintain his repressive dictatorship for 
more than thirty years. This helps to demonstrate Calder's insight that this is 
not only an important part of U.S. history but "an important episode in the 
history of the Dominican people.  For six of the eight years of occupation, 
military  officials  tried  to  remake  Dominican  society,  designing  and 
implementing programs meant to change the republic's political, economic, 
and social life."83 They failed. 
U.S. intervention extracted a human cost as well.  By definition, military 
government rules by force of arms, and nearly one hundred Marines and one 
thousand guerrillas were killed or wounded during the occupation.  Referring 
to the military government, Mil lett solemnly reminds us that, "As in Haiti, the 
cost of humanitarian reform had run it heavily into the red."84 Dominicans, by 
and large, viewed the U.S. military government as an uninvited  group of 
outsiders. Regardless of its perceived moral mandate, this government did 98 
not endear Dominicans to American "democracy," much less inspire them to 
replicate it.  For the U.S., the governing of other lands came with a price. The 
Dominican intervention once again brought into question whether or not such 
intervention was worth the professed benefits to Americans North and South. 99 
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5.  COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION: HAITI, 1915-1934 
With its independence from France in 1804, Haiti became the second 
republic established in the New World and the first in Latin America.  From 
the time of its independence until the U.S. intervention in 1915, this small 
island nation endured turbulent politics. During the period from 1843 to 1915 
there were over one hundred "civil wars, revolutions, insurrections, revolts, 
coups, and attentats."' Military generals served as presidents, and it was not 
until 1913 that Haiti had its  first civilian president, Michael Oreste.  His 
administration, however, lasted but a few months.  The succession of the 
Haitian executive was historically a product of an insurrection--coups d'etat--
led by local and regional military leaders. This volatile cycle had accelerated 
during the years preceding the 1915 intervention. From December, 1908, to 
December, 1915, seven Haitian presidents were poisoned, blown up, or 
otherwise removed from power.2 
Regional generals used Caco armies as the primary means to seize 
executive power. Caco was a term associated with peasants from remote 
villages and the mountains of the north who revolted against the government. 
General Vilbrum Guillaume Sam marched his Caco troops to Port-au-Prince 
and took power in March, 1915. Following Haiti's political tradition, another 
northern Caco army immediately began a revolt against Sam.  This 
insurrection was led by Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, a mulatre Nationalist physician, 
backed by Charles Zamor, a prominent member of the elite and the brother of 
a former president.  It was not long before the rebel forces made their 
predictable assault on the Palais National. The subsequent dismemberment 105 
of President Sam's body by a mob in reprisal for the massacre of nearly 200 
political prisoners combined with the prevailing chaos of the capital served as 
the U.S. rationale for landing 340 American Marines and bluejackets on the 
afternoon of July 28, 1915.3 
Backdrop to Intervention 
There were a number of factors that prompted the U.S. to intervene in 
Haiti including the naked preservation of its own economic and strategic 
interests, as well as a sincere,  if condescending, pursuit of humanitarian 
relief.  Unmistakably, the U.S. wanted to pre-empt the intervention of other 
powers in the region.  Earlier, both Germany and France had temporarily 
landed shore parties  in  the small  republic.4  This was a real  threat 
considering, on the one hand, the risks that the civil war created for foreign 
financial loan and business interests, and, on the other, Germany's economic 
penetration and desire to establish a coaling station in Haiti.5  Moreover, 
continuous civil war had drained Haiti's economy, and abject poverty and 
political instability were slowly dissolving the structure of Haitian society. 
Secretary of State Robert Lansing claimed that the U.S. intervened for two 
reasons:  "First, that it was in the interest of humanity and, second, that in 
case we had not taken the step, in all probability some other nation would 
have felt called upon to do so."6 Lansing went on to claim that U.S. motives 
had been wholly unselfish, despite admitting to President Wilson that his 
recommendation for military force was high-handed! 106 
Nonetheless, these "unselfish, yet high-handed methods" served short-
term U.S. interests. They always had. The use of gunboat diplomacy was 
nothing new in U.S.-Haitian relations.  In his book, Semper Fidelis: The 
History of the United States Marine Corps, Allan  R.  Mil lett notes that, 
"American landing parties had been ashore thirteen times in Haiti alone  .  .  . 
officers reconnoitered the city [Port-au-Prince], knowing that their mission 
someday might be to occupy the capital."8  The Haitian scholar Patrick 
Bellegarde-Smith also says that, there had been nineteen interventions by 
the U.S. in Haiti before the 1915 occupation.° Ludwell Montague argues that, 
in fact, for the twenty years prior to the occupation, the real power of Haitian 
rule was vested with the senior U.S. naval officer in the region, not the 
president of the republic.1° 
The 1915 intervention, however, marked a significant change in the use of 
military force in implementing U.S. foreign policy.  For the first time Marines 
would occupy, and to a large extent control, the internal affairs of another 
country. This was a radical departure from past national foreign policy and a 
monumental break from the historical functions and powers of the American 
military. 
Although the decision  to intervene with military force  in 1915 was 
consistent with previous U.S. policies, a formal occupation was not.  This 
decision represented the Wilson administration's feelings that  it had the 
prerogative,  if not the justification, to circumvent Haitian sovereignty and 
pursue unilateral action in this Caribbean nation on behalf of all Americans, 
North and South.  Montague believes that Admiral Caperton, and not 
Washington, initiated the occupation.11 Nonetheless, Wilson himself chose to 107 
send enough troops "to subordinate local authorities and completely control 
the country."12 Since this policy ultimately subjugated citizens of a sovereign 
nation to the will of another, its prospects for long-term success were dubious 
at best. The brash character of this policy was further aggravated by the 
arrogance and methods of many Americans who implemented  it.  The 
missionary zeal and military efficiency of color conscience and ethnocentric 
Americans did little to salve the wounds to Haitian individual dignity and 
national pride that the occupation created. 
The Wilson administration, however, was not primarily interested  in 
Haitian sensibilities. Above all else, it wanted to control events and results. 
Washington did not overly concern itself with the details of diplomacy until 
U.S. public opinion was mobilized as the occupation dragged on.  The 
Marines had proven themselves as attractive agents for implementing foreign 
policy in Haiti, since as previously discussed, the military had the capacity to 
produce rapid results, for it controlled outcomes by the decisive use of force. 
Washington was quite satisfied with a military solution to the Haitian problem, 
as demonstrated by the lack of any civilian officials in Haiti, save the legation, 
for nearly the first year of the occupation.13 
During  this  period,  Marines  and  naval  personnel  were  given 
unprecedented autonomy to administer this island republic. As Emily Balch 
pointed out, after seven years of occupation, the senior representative in Haiti 
was a U.S. Marine.14  Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti's Financial Advisor and 
General Receiver during part of the occupation, claimed that Navy and 
Marine Corps officers consistently initiated civil projects without direction from 
Washington and remained outside civil jurisdiction during the occupation.15 108 
Harold Palmer supported this assertion noting that the U.S. military held 
virtually every administrative and executive position within the government of 
Haiti.16 In remembering his time in Haiti, then Marine captain Wise, reflected: 
"They looked silently on while we all experimented with their country. 
Although, as an officer,  I was not supposed to delve into the politics of the 
Republic of Haiti, I had to give some thought to existing conditions in order to 
handle my own job intelligently."17 Hans Schmidt goes further, arguing that 
Marines enjoyed "practically unlimited power" in the republic during the 
occupation.18 Historian Rayford Logan even states that Admiral Caperton  was 
"in a large measure the architect of United States policy before and during 
the early part of the occupation of Haiti."19 
This unique autonomy was initiated with the act of Congress that would 
"Authorize and empower officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine 
Corps to serve under the government of the Republic of Haiti, and for other 
purposes." 2°  Thus "empowered," Marines would serve as officers in the 
Gendarmerie d'HaIti and were thereby commissioned to organize, train, 
equip, and lead this new institution. This placed them in charge of not only 
the police and military functions of the Haitian government but made them 
initially responsible for supervising and implementing a majority of the "other 
purposes" of nation building during the occupation. 
The Gendarmerie d'HaIti  performed  all  police and  military  patrols, 
administered the penitentiary and local jails, managed traffic, provided fire 
and emergency services, supervised anti-smuggling operations, and  was 
responsible for lighthouse and coast guard services.  It supervised sanitation, 
communications, postal services, and public work programs throughout the 109 
country. The Gendarmerie was responsible for the construction of schools, 
bridges, roads, telegraph lines, and irrigation systems.  Officers of the 
Gendarmerie monitored national weights and measures, supervised customs 
and immigration, collected vital statistics, and became ex-officio directors and 
paymasters of schools. Agriculture, marketing, and rural medicine were also 
greatly influenced by the Gendarmerie, and its officers even attempted to 
shape peasant religious  behavior.  These officers became communal 
advisors and tax collectors and unofficial justices of the peace in rural areas. 
In essence, these Marines were "in charge of their rural fiefs  .  .  . as  local 
Haitian warlords had always behaved."21 
Needless to say, this arrangement allowed Marines to exercise authority 
and influence unknown in the military tradition of the U.S. These Marines 
were allowed, in fact directed, to create and shape change in the political, 
social, and economic institutions of Haiti. They were given minimal guidance 
to perform this role, and in the discharge of their duties they rarely received 
direction from outside the Marine Corps chain of command. Marine influence 
was greatest during the early stages of the occupation and diminished over 
time as U.S. and Haitian civilians assumed more control of treaty services 
and Haitian affairs. Marines, however, continued to control the Gendarmerie 
throughout the occupation. 
For ease of analysis, it is useful to divide the U.S. administration of this 
twenty-year occupation into the three periods as Michel S. Laguerre does in 
his book, The Military and Society in Haiti.  The first period, from 1915 to 
1922, centered on the organization of the Gendarmerie d'HaIti and the 
exercise of predominant Marine influence.  Laguerre argues that, this was 110 
"the phase during which the U.S. Marines were learning the ropes of 
government."22  The second period,  1922 to  1928,  represented a time in 
which Washington refocused its attention on Haiti to coordinate the efforts of 
the occupation. The third and final period,  1928 to  1934, defined a time of 
transition, in effect a Haitianization of treaty efforts, functions, and institutions 
in preparation for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. 
The Ropes of Government 
Despite Washington's rhetoric, its actions upon landing Marines on July 
28, 1915, spoke more accurately of its intentions. The administration not only 
wanted to preserve life and property, it clearly sought to control the Haitian 
domestic situation.  Secretary of State Robert Lansing made this clear in 
writing to President Wilson only twelve days after the Marine landing when he 
stated, "I do not see why it would not be as easy to control a government with 
a president as it  is to control the Haitian Congress and administrative 
officers."23  The means of "control" were U.S. Marines.  Three days after 
Lansing's letter, the U.S. candidate of choice, Sudre Dartiguenave, was 
elected to the presidency by a Haitian Congress in the conspicuous presence 
of American Marines.24 
This event was the beginning of the politicization of these Marines. 
Ironically,  Washington  directed  them  to  promote  political  stability  by 
establishing an apolitical and professional military in Haiti, yet in the process 
these Marines themselves became more politicized. 111 
The U.S. influenced the new Haitian government by controlling both its 
military and finances.  Immediately, the Marines began disbanding the old 
Haitian army and on August 19, 1915, Marines seized all Haitian customs 
houses on orders from the State Department.25 Marines took possession of 
$500,000, and Washington gained  control  of  this  primary source  of 
government funds as a measure to  help meet dire  Haitian  financial 
problems.26  It  also, however, provided convenient leverage  to coerce 
government compliance with the desires of the U.S.  Throughout the 
occupation, the U.S. stationed a brigade of Marines in Haiti. This contingent 
of one thousand or more Marines served as a strong deterrent against 
Haitian opposition to U.S. efforts.  Nonetheless, their mission did not appear 
substantially different than the "benevolent assimilation" that Washington 
assigned General E.  S. Otis during the occupation of the Philippines 
following the Spanish American Wary 
Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller was the first commander of this brigade, 
serving from August 15, 1915, to November 21, 1916, and was thus the 
senior Marine officer during the initial phases of the occupation. He was a 
proven combat leader and highly respected Marine officer. Above all, he was 
a no-nonsense officer who would exhaust all efforts to succeed at any task. A 
Virginian with a reputation as a hard drinker and ruthless fighter, Waller had 
recently escaped a conviction in a court-martial for war atrocities  in the 
campaign against insurgents in the Philippines. He was both ambitious and 
tireless in his efforts to produce results in Haiti and served as a mentor and 
friend to the legendary Smedley Butler, who would play an instrumental role 112 
in the establishment of the Gendarmerie and the early supervision of the 
occupation. 
Hans Schmidt in his book, Maverick Marine: General Smedley Butler and 
the  Contradictions  of American  Military  History,  describes  Butler  as 
"impetuous, politically enterprising, a celebrated combat hero."28 The exploits 
of his thirty-three year career spanned the entire era of the "Banana Wars," 
beginning with the Spanish American War. To this day he is a lionized icon 
in Marine Corps history and tradition. On December 3, 1915, this abrasive 
and  defiantly  anti-bureaucratic  Lieutenant  Colonel  became  the  first 
Commandant of the Gendarmerie d'HaIti, and wore the stars of a Major 
General until his departure on May 1, 1918.  Relentlessly he laid down the 
foundation of the Gendarmerie so that it would become both a professional 
army and public service institution under American tutelage. 
Both Waller and Butler viewed the Gendarmerie as "a viable political force 
in Haiti and the chief instrument of  American reform  .  .  .  free of Haitian 
influence and State Department supervision."29  Officers of this new Haitian 
Gendarmerie would be Marine officers and NCOs appointed by the president 
of Haiti upon the nomination of the U. S. president.  Ultimately, Haitians were 
to replace these Marines upon successful examination as outlined in the 
treaty of 1915. As an incentive to attract quality volunteers to this detached 
duty, Marines received salaries from both the U.S. and Haiti.  This was not 
glamorous duty, for it required long, exhausting hours of hard work under the 
most austere conditions.  Marines, nonetheless, received the privileges of 
higher rank and enjoyed a great deal of autonomy.  Marine banana war 
veteran and later Gendarmerie commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Wise, later 113 
confessed that even in Cuba "we didn't have the absolute power we had 
here."3° 
At the outset of the occupation, Marine commanders found themselves 
serving as U.S. proconsuls in  Haiti.  They received  little guidance from 
Washington and the State Department and only minimal supervision from 
their Naval seniors.  In 1916 Admiral Caperton, commander of all Naval 
forces in the region, left Haiti for the Dominican Republic, where he would 
remain for the duration of his command of military operations throughout 
Hispaniola.  Admiral Knapp,  chargé  d'  affaires  and  ranking  military 
commander in Hispaniola, was consumed by his duties as military governor 
of the Dominican Republic and rarely concerned himself with the details of 
Haitian affairs.  After a trip to Haiti in 1917, however, he observed that the 
Gendarmerie d'HaYti was "striving to get too much power in its hands," and 
claimed that martial law in Haiti was equivalent to military government in the 
Dominican Republic.31  In effect, this left the Marine brigade commander and 
the Commandant of the Gendarmerie in charge of the administration of 
Haitian affairs during the initial stages of the occupation. 
Langley argues that Colonel Waller was Haiti's real ruler during his tour 
as brigade commander.  Not nearly as abrasive  as  Butler,  Waller, 
nonetheless, held the mulatre elite in contempt and displayed a patronizing 
attitude that was aggravated by his racial prejudice. These insensitivities did 
not serve diplomacy well and predictably offended the Haitians.  When 
Dartiguenave complained to Washington about Waller's conduct, the brigade 
commander did not hesitate to remind the president that: "You are president 
because we Americans are in Haiti.  If you continue to denounce me, I'll have 114 
my government recall its troops for twenty-four hours and by the time we pass 
by  .  .  .  Gonave [Island], you'll be chased out of the Presidential Palace."32 
Waller would not be hindered  in  his efforts to run Haiti "as a piece of 
machinery."33 
Opposition to the occupation grew, especially in the ranks of the Haitian 
political elite. The U.S. had coerced Haiti into ratifying the treaty of 1915 that 
outlined provisions for the administration of the occupation. This, according 
to Montague, amounted to controlling  Haiti by military occupation and 
financial extortion.34  By August, 1916, newspapers in the U.S. reported 
Washington's  establishment  of  an  "American  police  and  financial 
protectorate" over Haiti.35  Several of the articles in this treaty, however, 
conflicted with Haiti's constitution. Consequently, Washington directed junior 
State and Navy officials to compose a new constitution, and the U.S. supplied 
a rough draft of this document to Haitian officials.  Later in the 1920 election 
campaign, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt would boast 
that he had written Haiti's constitution.36  In response, the Haitian Congress 
began to draft its own version, which was unfriendly to U.S. interests and was 
deemed unacceptable by Washington since, among other  objectional 
features, it did not recognize foreign land ownership or provisions for the 
Gendarmerie.37 
Washington directed American Minister A. Bailly-Blanchard, to prevent the 
passage of this Haitian constitution. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels 
gave Waller's replacement, Brigadier General Eli K. Cole, "full discretionary 
power" in dissolving Haiti's National Assembly if he deemed it necessary.36 
Like the Wilson administration, Cole preferred that President Dartiguenave 115 
dissolve the Congress, yet he was willing to dissolve it himself by force if 
necessary to prevent the passage of the defiant constitution.  When the 
Haitian National Assembly was in the process of voting in its new constitution 
and threatening to impeach Dartiguenave because of his cooperation with 
the Americans, Cole acted. He did not heed State Department instructions to 
suspend all actions to dissolve the assembly until he received a message to 
do so. Instead, he directed Butler to intervene as a Haitian official and obtain 
the order to dissolve the Assembly from Dartiguenave. 
Dartiguenave,  afraid  of the repercussions  of  this  act,  wanted the 
Americans to intervene directly. Butler told him that if he wanted to remain in 
power, he did not have any option other than to issue an order to dissolve the 
National Assembly. When Dartiguenave demanded the co-signatures of his 
cabinet members before he would issue this decree, Butler immediately 
mustered the two ministers--forcibly apprehended by the General's chauffeur. 
Armed with this presidential order, Butler dissolved the National Assembly 
under the watchful guard of fifty loyal gendarmes on June 19, 1917.  Butler 
later wrote that the assembly had been dissolved by "genuinely Marine Corps 
methods."39 The Assembly would not again convene for another twelve 
years.49 
The authority of the Marines continued to grow.  In November, 1917, 
Colonel John H. Russell assumed command of the Marine brigade in Haiti. 
For the next thirteen years he would be the senior Marine in this republic and 
would eventually be commissioned as the U.S. High Commissioner for Haiti-
a position from which he would virtually orchestrate the entire occupation. 
Even at the time of Russell's arrival, the power wielded by Marines  was 116 
formidable, as illustrated by Butler in a letter to John Mcllhenny, who later 
became the senior U.S. official in Haiti. Butler boasted: 
We have over 15,000 at work in the whole of Haiti, a goodly-sized 
body of intelligent voters for any project the U.S. may wish to put 
across.  .  .  .  Don't worry about our ability to "put over" any kind of 
popular demonstration down here; just tell us what you want done 
and everybody from the President down will shout for it.41 
Butler would soon leave Haiti, yet only six months after this letter was written, 
Marine commanders would demonstrate the truth of his claim during the 
American supervision of the public vote for a Haiti's new constitution.42 
After dissolving the National Assembly, Washington wanted to finalize a 
new constitution for Haiti. Although the State Department and Haiti provided 
input, Admiral Knapp and Colonel Cole were the major contributors to this 
document.  Without an assembly to ratify a new constitution, the Haitian 
government persuaded Washington to seek its ratification by presenting this 
constitution to the people in a plebiscite. Lansing directed the Gendarmerie 
officers to explain the proposed constitution to the people, "especially the 
illiterates."43  Subsequently,  the Marines campaigned throughout  Haiti, 
handing out refreshments, conducting barbecues, and threatening arrest for 
any public expression of opposition that "tends to incite distrust or more in the 
minds of the people."'"  If nothing else, this provided insightful meaning to a 
statement in Chesty Puller's biography that related, "Butler had created the 
Gendarmerie d'Haiti with a shrewd disregard for precedent."45 
Marines ran the polls and handed out ballots. The outcome of this vote 
clearly demonstrated the effective control of the Marines. The plebiscite was 
held on June 12, 1918, and the voting results were 98,225 for and 768 117 
against the new constitution, with sixty-seven out of ninety-six polls reporting 
no negative votes.46  Population estimates suggested that less than five 
percent of the population voted, "many of whom had no idea what they were 
voting for" according to Marine commander Russell.47 
The most controversial project of the occupation, however, was the road 
construction program that started in July, 1916 under the supervision of the 
Gendarmerie.  In 1915 there were virtually no roads in Haiti.  This posed a 
substantial obstacle to U.S. efforts  in  nation  building  by undermining 
progress  in  national  transportation,  communication,  and  security. 
Furthermore, there was no easy solution to rectify this problem since there 
was no labor, money, or native incentive to change this situation until a 
Haitian cabinet member disclosed a 1863 Code Rural to Butler, which he 
then adapted to support an ambitious road construction program.  Under 
Admiral Caperton's direction and Butler's supervision, a 470-mile road 
network was constructed in Haiti.48 This was done using the Corvee system in 
reference to the ancient French Cory& law that required peasants to 
volunteer their labors in lieu of taxes.49 The material accomplishments of this 
two-year program were impressive, and the project was well received in 
those regions where the laborers were properly cared for and the limits of the 
law observed. 
The material success of the Cory& system, however, was greatly 
tarnished by the eventual excesses of those charged with implementing it 
the Gendarmerie.5° According to the Cory& law, peasants were to provide a 
tax or donate three days labor for the upkeep of public highways and 
communications.  They were not required to work outside of their local 1 1 8 
communes. Butler was credited with "running a tight ship" during his watch, 
yet this system proved very susceptible to abuse.  All too frequently, local 
officials and Gendarmes misused funds, dispensed preferential treatment, 
and disregarded limitations on the duration, location, and burden of peasant 
labor.51  In some areas this system was perverted into a forced slave labor 
system in which peasants were repeatedly bound together and marched 
outside their home districts to work under guard, at a relentless pace, through 
brutal terrain, for extended periods of time, and with few provisions for their 
basic needs.52 
Although many of the abuses of the Corvee were carried out by Haitian 
officials and Gendarmes, the Marines bore responsibility for abuses as well. 
Most of the allegations of abuse by Marines in the Corvee program referred to 
incidents after Butler's departure from Haiti; however, by his own admission 
he wrote, "it is not well to describe in a letter the methods used by us to build 
this road."53  Navy testimony before Congress reported that violence and 
attempted escapes during this road construction produced at least one 
hundred Haitian deaths.54  The Commandant of the Marine Corps, Major 
General George Barnett, reprimanded the brigade commander in  Haiti, 
Colonel Russell, in a confidential personal letter stating that testimony during 
the court-martial of a Marine private had demonstrated to him that "practically 
indiscriminate killing of natives has gone on for some time."55  He further 
demanded the immediate and relentless personal attention of Russell to 
exterminate this system and investigate and prosecute all perpetrators of 
these atrocities. 119 
On October 1, 1918, the Corvee officially ended, yet the negative impact of 
this program did not disappear.  As peasant opposition to the Corvee had 
grown, so had the fear that it foreshadowed a return to slavery sponsored by 
the U.S. This helped to foment the seeds of the Caco War that broke out in 
the fall of 1918.  The Gendarmerie, under the leadership of the Marines, 
conducted an aggressive and successful counterinsurgency against Caco 
rebel forces. This conflict lasted until late summer of 1920 and cost the lives 
of at least two thousand Caco, and one hundred dead or wounded 
gendarmes.56 
With the close of the First World War, the U.S. public focused on other 
foreign policy concerns, and Haiti became a major issue  in  the 1920 
presidential election.  The Republicans exploited incidents like the Barnett 
letter and the growing reports of repression and abuse of the occupation.  In 
the fall of 1920, the Secretary of the Navy directed Admiral Henry T. Mayo to 
conduct an investigation into the allegations of brutalities by the Marines. His 
investigation cited only a few isolated cases of abuse and sought to minimize 
the more brutal aspects of the occupation. As Schmidt points out, however, 
Mayo conspicuously failed to call as a witness now Colonel Wise, the 
Commandant of the Gendarmerie, who knew of the "rough stuff" of the 
occupation and had made it known that, "If they put me on the stand under 
I oath  was going  to  tell  the  truth."57  The Republicans branded the 
investigation a whitewash, and Warren G. Harding attacked the Democratic 
administration's  continued  occupation  of  Haiti  and  Wilson's  moral 
imperialism throughout Latin America. 120 
After winning  the presidency,  however,  Harding  did  not end the 
occupation. Instead, the new administration reorganized it.  This ushered in 
the second period of the occupation in which treaty efforts became more 
centralized,  coordinated,  and  controlled.  Professor  Carl  Kelsey, 
commissioned by the Academy of Political and Social Science to research 
the American intervention in Haiti, concluded that poor administration and not 
evil design was to blame for the disappointing results of the occupation.58 In 
late 1921 and early 1922, the U.S. Senate conducted an in-depth inquiry into 
the occupation and dispatched the McCormick Committee to  Haiti.  Its 
chairman, Senator Medill McCormick of Illinois, interviewed both the Haitian 
elite and peasants and reached the same conclusion as Kelsey but was 
convinced the occupation was, nonetheless, necessary for another twenty 
years. 
McCormick praised the actions of the Marines despite the few cases of 
proven abuse and cruelty.  He did, however, urge greater discretion in the 
selection  of  Marine  officers  for  duty  in  Haiti  considering  the  "dual 
responsibility" of this duty. "They should be selected not only because of their 
capacity to command troops, but to command them in Haiti and among the 
Haitian people."59 This implied that these officers should not only be selected 
for their racial tolerance but their political savvy as well.  Laguerre points to 
another problem--the Marine Corps, State Department, and Washington, did 
not agree on the role of the Marines in Haiti.6° The McCormick Commission 
noted this as well and recommended that Washington appoint a single 
authority in Haiti to supervise and coordinate the occupation's efforts and to 
help prevent the mistakes and abuses of the past. As Challenger observed, 121 
however, the U.S. would not begin to institutionalize the coordination of 
foreign policy between civilian and military agencies until 1938.61 
Up to this point, there was little coordination of effort between the different 
agencies of the occupation.  The U.S. was not, however, solely concerned 
with the effective coordination of treaty services and charting a course for the 
return of Haitian sovereignty.  Washington's central concern remained the 
control of Haitian affairs as confirmed by the administration's focus on further 
consolidating the authority of the occupation in the hands of a U.S. military 
commander. Schmidt provided evidence that Wilson knew the extralegal 
nature of the measures he endorsed during the occupation.62 Secretary of 
State Hughes nearly selected  Butler as High Commissioner but was 
dissuaded from doing so by Dana G. Munro, then working in the Division of 
Latin American Affairs, and members of the McCormick Commission because 
of  Butler's  temperament.  Despite  the  McCormick  Commission's 
recommendation for civilian control of the occupation, Harding commissioned 
John H. Russell, a Marine Brigadier General, as Ambassador Extraordinary in 
Haiti on February 11, 1922.63 With this appointment, the Navy Department 
relinquished responsibility for the administration of the occupation to the 
State Department. As High Commissioner, Russell consolidated diplomatic 
and administrative authority and was empowered with the command to 
coordinate the occupation.64 122 
The Coordination of Occupation  
The Dartiguenave government had outlived its usefulness to the U.S. 
occupation.  Dartiguenave had become stubborn over time, especially in 
regard to American loan consolidation and the U.S. control of Haitian fiscal 
matters.  Having alienated  both  his  countrymen and  treaty  officials, 
Dartiguenave was not reelected by his hand-picked Conseil d'Etat when his 
term of office expired. Instead, the Council of the State elected distinguished 
poet and statesman, Louis Borno to the presidency on April 10, 1922. 
Although initially opposed to the occupation, Borno was philosophically in 
favor of both its means and end, since he favored Haitian  rule by a 
progressive, authoritarian leader over the uneducated masses. Clearly not  a 
puppet of the U.S., he joined with Russell in what observers have often called 
a "two-headed dictatorship" of Haiti that lasted nearly eight years.65 
Although Russell felt such dual control of any nation was absurd, he 
relentlessly drove himself and others to make this policy successful. Russell 
exhibited an authoritarian style of leadership and jealously demanded the 
control of the formulation and implementation of all policy in Haiti.  Moreover, 
he did not hesitate to secure the removal of those military and civilian treaty 
officials who failed to recognize his authority. The extent of Russell's  power 
and influence was perhaps best conveyed by the words of  one such 
dismissal, Financial Adviser-General Receiver of Haiti, Arthur C. Millspaugh, 
when he stated: 
Nominally, the treaty officials are responsible to the President of Haiti 
or to their respective [Haitian] Ministers; in practice, they are directed 
by the High Commissioner.  .  .  .  He not only vetoes but also drafts 123 
Haitian  legislation.  He  negotiates  contracts  with  American  
companies, determines the administrative attitude to be assumed  
toward them by the American treaty officials, and interests himself in  
the details of claims, the collection of revenue, road construction and  
in agriculture, educational, and sanitary matters.  American treaty  
officers have little official contact with the Haitian executive and their  
relations with the Ministers have necessarily become perfunctory or  
formal.66  
Russell, however, relied on force for his success, and the State 
Department began to worry about his authoritarian  rule.  This distress 
increased notably when in 1927 Russell requested the return of 350 Marines 
to assist  in  "constructive work contemplated for next winter,  including, 
perhaps, the modifying of the present constitution and drastic, but much 
needed reforms in the judiciary system of Haiti."67 
To many, this ever increasing penetration into the internal affairs of this 
Caribbean republic represented the crux of a failed U.S. policy in  Haiti. 
There simply was no plan for equipping Haitians to rule themselves.  This 
was becoming a failed experiment in social engineering.68  Political stability 
achieved through force and material progress artificially supported by the 
U.S. were not healing Haiti's ills, much less providing preventative measures 
for its healthy future. Some observers criticized the occupation for denying a 
generation of Haitians the political experience of governing their own nation.66 
Senator Borah proved to be an effective champion of the Haitian people and 
attacked American policy in Haiti.7°  This represented a growing U.S. and 
Haitian concern about the time line of an American withdrawal. 124 
Preparation for Withdrawal  
The final  period  of the occupation,  1928 to  1934, saw a forced 
Haitianization of all treaty services and hasty preparations for the withdrawal 
of Americans from Haitian soil.  Until this period, the U.S. had taken few steps 
to share authority in sovereign decisions with Haitians or to prepare them for 
effective and peaceful self-rule. The occupation remained largely militarized. 
In 1928, three out of five treaty officials were still military officers and all U.S. 
officials in Haiti remained under the absolute control of Marine General 
Russell, who was backed by the Marine brigade and the Gendarmerie!' 
Albeit slowly, treaty officials were making some progress in relinquishing their 
control of Haitian affairs.  Nonetheless, the driving force behind the treaty 
services remained  largely the Marine-led Gendarmerie  d'HaIti.72  The 
Gendarmerie eventually changed its name to the Garde d'Haiti in recognition 
of its non-police duties and to help break its association with the Caco  War 
campaign and the earlier French rural police.73 The pace of this effort would, 
however, soon escalate. 
In 1928 the U.S. elected Herbert C. Hoover to the presidency, ushering in 
a time of drastic transition and change. Foreign adventurism was becoming 
less and less popular with the American public, and the crash of the New 
York Stock Exchange in October, 1929 and the resulting Depression brought 
into question the conventional wisdom of government policies in general.  As 
opposition to the occupation grew at home and abroad, Hoover sought a way 
out of Haiti and other U.S. interventions  in the Caribbean and Central 125 
America. The Haitians themselves would help expedite Hoover's decision 
making. 
As 1930 approached, it appeared that Borno might delay the termination 
of his presidency and the election of a new National Assembly. At the same 
time,  Haitian students initiated an anti-government movement.  These 
conditions  combined  with  the depressed  domestic  economy,  helped 
transform student disturbances into a general protest against the occupation. 
In December, 1929, a platoon of Marines defended themselves against the 
assault of 1,500 rioters. Marines killed twelve and wounded twenty-three of 
these protesters in self-defense, yet the U.S. press quickly billed this tragedy 
as the "Cayes Massacre."74 The next day Hoover requested funds for another 
congressional investigation of the occupation 
In February, 1930, Hoover appointed the Forbes Commission to review 
the conditions of Haiti and recommend specific plans for the withdrawal of 
American forces.  After conducting two weeks of hearings in  Haiti,  the 
commission recommended increased Haitianization of all treaty services and 
the establishment of a timetable for the withdrawal of Marines and American 
officials from the republic.  It also advised minimizing U.S. interference in the 
domestic affairs of Haiti and the termination of the High Commissioner 
position in favor of a non-military Minister.  In response to the commission's 
report, Hoover immediately ordered withdrawal efforts speeded up. 
Russell worked out a plan with Colonel Frank E. Evans, the Commandant 
of the Garde, to ease Borno out of office.  On May 15, 1930, Russell got 
Eugene Roy, an elite exchange broker, elected as interim president by the 
Council of the State until a National Assembly was elected, which would 126 
appoint a legitimate Haitian executive.  Haitians eventually elected members 
of this new National Assembly on October 14 and, less than a month later, 
General Russell left Haiti with  little pomp and circumstance.  Hoover's 
replacement for Russell, Dr. Dana G. Munro, assumed his post as American 
Minister on November 16 and two days later Haiti's National Assembly 
elected Stenio Vincent as president.76 
After the departure of Russell, the influence of Marines was reduced to 
matters relating to the Garde.  They primarily concerned themselves with 
developing Haitian military leaders and preparing the Garde for the effective 
performance of its duties after the American withdrawal.  The last Marines 
departed Haiti on August 21, 1934.77 
The Impact of Intervention 
By the close of the Haitian intervention, Washington had come to realize 
that a policy of formal occupation was far too costly politically.  Both 
Americans and Haitians had grown weary of the occupation. Congressional 
inquiries, the press, and foreign reports mobilized public opinion in the U.S. 
to mandate a withdrawal from the republic.  This helped set the stage for 
policymakers to seek alternative and less conspicuous ways to control 
foreign events in the future--a search for covert means to political ends that 
would not jeopardize support at home and abroad.  Political expediency had 
driven the intervention, and now political necessity demanded the withdrawal 
from Haiti.  The costs of empire proved prohibitive  for the U.S., and 127 
policymakers now had to face the difficulties of departing, with honor, from a 
policy lacking a clear mission, attainable goals, and a plan for withdrawal. 
Marines did not regret their departure from Haiti. With their expeditionary 
experience throughout the region, many Marines viewed themselves as 
"American foreign legionnaires on the fringes of their nation's tropic empire." 
In Haiti, however, the "tropic empire" was not very alluring. The quality of life 
was poor by U.S. standards, and there were few perks for the average Marine 
serving there. He did, nonetheless, enjoy a considerable degree of authority 
and freedom of action not found stateside or on other foreign shores.  A 
Marine captain later described Marines on duty in Haiti: 
They are men on the point of contact, keeping the peace in the  
detached and isolated district stations, where the gendarme officer,  
besides being military and police authority, is a director of civil affairs  
as well.  Haiti is largely rural, and it is not too much to say that the  
security of the government rests on their shoulders, and the condition  
of the people depends on their wisdom and judgment. The duty is  
responsible and exacting, and frequently unexciting  to the  last  
deg ree.79  
In fighting a guerrilla war and supervising a colonial administration, Marines 
sampled the sweet taste of autonomy and power. Many of these Marines 
would agree with one experienced banana warrior's description of this era as 
"a period of Marine Corps history, one of danger, hardship, tragedy and 
achievement."93 Although they would never again enjoy such authority and 
freedom of action in the performance of their duty, these Marines were not 
sad to leave Haiti.81 
Because of their role as de facto proconsuls, Marine commanders in Haiti 
became increasingly politicized as they attempted to create an apolitical 128 
Gendarmerie. They were no longer merely responsible for accomplishing a 
military mission and troop welfare; they were rebuilding a nation.  As 
previously stated, both Waller and Butler saw the Gendarmerie as a political 
force to implement American reform. These Marine leaders did not welcome 
meddling by politicians or "armchair admirals."  They simply wanted a 
mission and the freedom to accomplish it as they saw best. These Marines 
got their wish during the initial phases of the occupation.  According to 
Colonel Cole, relations with the Haitian government were often conducted by 
the commander of the Marines without directions from either the Department 
of the State or the Navy.82 Washington's lack of interference, however, turned 
into a near complete lack of attention, and Cole eventually wrote his 
superiors complaining that, "I have absolutely no knowledge as to the policy 
that our government desires to follow in regard to Haiti."83  In the absence of 
guidance and supervision, the Marines simply took charge of the situation.  In 
fact,  Cole and other Marine commanders preferred a formal  military 
government in Haiti and felt they were fully capable of establishing one. 
Butler epitomized the "take charge" attitude of the Marines. The untamed 
son of a U.S. Senator, he was a consummate warrior with political ambitions. 
A veteran of countless foreign expeditions, he eventually drew upon his 
experience in establishing constabularies during the banana wars to become 
an effective advocate for the militarization of domestic law enforcement in the 
U.S. during the "war" on organized crime in the 1920s. Reformist politicians 
recruited Butler as the police chief of Philadelphia in 1924.  Although very 
successful during this two-year leave from the Marines, his performance was 
a dangerous mixing of military and police roles and represented a movement 129 
toward increased military intervention into domestic U.S. affairs.  President 
Coolidge finally concluded that this arrangement was of "doubtful propriety 
and should be employed only in cases of emergency."84 
Butler returned to the Marines, but his firebrand character was losing him 
political capital. Although the senior officer at the time, he was passed over 
for the position of Commandant of the Marine Corps. After waging a personal 
battle with the Secretary of the Navy, he was reprimanded by Washington for 
statements he made concerning our involvement in Nicaragua and later 
escaped court-martial to retire.86 After leaving the Corps Butler unsuccessfully 
campaigned for a seat in the Senate. This effectively ended the "maverick" 
Marine's influence both in the Corps and in politics.86 
The Capstone of Empire 
The occupation of Haiti represented the crest of U.S. empire, during 
which Marines enjoyed power unknown to them before or since.  Upon 
embarking on its quest for empire, the U.S. left on its own shores much of its 
military traditions.  This willful compromise of principles culminated with 
Washington commissioning Marines and naval personnel to serve ostensibly 
under the name of another country to pursue U.S. interests. The first phases 
of the occupation were clearly the most repressive and damaging to the more 
positive aspects of the military intervention.  U.S. actions grossly contrasted 
with stated purposes, which served to undercut the credibility of the U.S. in 
Latin America.  After the Caco War, the role of the Marines diminished to 
those functions of the Gendarmerie.87 However, General Russell's influence 130 
and his plot with Gendarmerie Commandant Evans to force Borno out of the 
presidency demonstrated that Marines still exercised political influence even 
late in the occupation.88 
From its very conception, the policy to intervene in Haiti was destined to 
fail,  since  it  required Marines to serve the  interests  of two countries 
simultaneously.  They  could  not.  Instead,  intervention  produced 
disappointing results for all interested parties. When a quick solution to the 
Haitian situation eluded Washington, the U.S. became mired in a foreign 
policy commitment with high stakes in national prestige.  With policymakers 
unsure of the path back home, the occupation dragged on.  Over time the 
U.S. became frustrated, unable to achieve much more than artificial stability 
in this Caribbean republic. Ultimately, it would take the mobilization of public 
opinion in the U.S. to force Washington to abandon this intervention for a 
policy more in line with national principles of democracy. The notion that 
military officers could simultaneously and justly perform their duties as 
instruments of U.S. foreign policy and fairly shape the political, social, and 
economic conditions of Haiti had proved absurd. 
The Legacy Continues: The U.S. and Haiti Today 
As this thesis is being written, U.S. Marines once again occupy Haiti. 
Many of the same conditions that existed before the occupation remain the 
same or worse today.  More alarming is the fact that answers to the same 
questions of Haitian political stability and social equity remain as hauntingly 
familiar as they are illusive.  For this latest policy of intervention to succeed 131 
and meet the expectations of  its  authors,  the objectives  of  this new 
occupation must be quickly realized and the criteria for withdrawal clearly 
articulated and followed, or the errors of the past will be repeated.  Most 
importantly, Americans must jealously guard against the ultimate irony, that in 
the process of establishing democratic ideals abroad, they abandon them 
themselves. 132 
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6.  CONCLUSIONS: THE PRICE OF ABANDONING TRADITION 
The Sun Sets on American Empire 
Although direct U.S. military intervention  in Central America and the 
Caribbean ended, for the time being, with the departure of Marines from Haiti 
in August, 1934, the impact of this policy lingered. Throughout the Americas, 
the policy of diplomacy through force proved largely bankrupt, and this would 
have  long-term  implications  for  the  future  of  U.S.-Latin  American 
relations.The U.S. had experimented with formal empire, and the results were 
disappointing to all Americans, North and South. The methods used by the 
U.S. to achieve this insular empire decisively influenced how policymakers, 
the general public, the military, and Latin Americans viewed the intervention 
of U.S. forces in the Western Hemisphere. 
The "golden age" of American intervention in Central America and the 
Caribbean lasted from 1898 to the mid-1930s.  In the end, the U.S. failed to 
overcome the innate problems accompanying colonial administration.  In the 
eyes of most Latin Americans, these interventions lacked political legitimacy. 
Consequently, benefits derived from this policy tended to be marginal and/or 
short lived.  The U.S. could not overcome the challenges facing such a 
political arrangement.  In 1935, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Miller, 
a member of General Harry Lee's  staff  in  the  Dominican  Republic, 
summarized the problem: "As civil governments are not infallible, no more so 
are military governments, and the fact alone, that military occupations 
ordinarily have their inception in the failure of civil processes, make [ski the 138 
functions of armed occupation exceedingly difficult, and peaceful solution of 
problems often impossible."' 
The inability of the U.S. to achieve its reforms by fiat combined with the 
pressure of American and international public opinion to force a withdrawal 
from the region. Interestingly, this U.S. retreat from direct military intervention 
paralleled  later  patterns  of  Latin  American  military  intervention  and 
withdrawal from the direct control of government that appeared throughout 
the Hemisphere. After experimenting with "revolution from above," many of 
these Latin American military ventures in government ended with soldiers 
returning the reins of government to their civilian predecessors.2 By retreating 
to the barracks, Latin militaries assumed their traditional position of political 
autonomy, which assured them the power and prerogative to intervene 
without assuming the  responsibilities  inherent  in  governing.  With a 
withdrawal from the region, the U.S. assumed a similar position in regards to 
Latin America.  It no longer assumed responsibility for governing the region, 
yet it maintained its prerogative to intervene.  U.S. military interventions in 
Grenada, Panama, and Haiti in the 1980s and 1990s provide the most recent 
evidence of this relationship. 
The interventions of 1915-1934 created a dilemma for many Americans 
entrusted with transplanting "democracy" abroad.  Like many of their 
predecessors in earlier interventions, they believed in the nobility of their 
intentions yet realized the meaning of the results--"governments and nations 
only in name."3  At times, they also found themselves, in the name of 
democracy, charged with the preservation of a non-democratically elected 139 
administration, a dictatorship lacking only in  title.  Because of this, many 
participants, North and South, would welcome the sun setting on this empire. 
The Departure From U.S. Military Tradition 
As the U.S. expanded its global role at the turn of the twentieth century, it 
also altered the role of its military. Over time, the armed forces evolved from 
the guardians of national defense to the tools of foreign policy. Culminating 
with the occupation of Haiti, the U.S. had greatly shaped its military into an 
agent of political change--a radical departure from the ideals of the country's 
founding fathers.  The deployment of Marines had become increasingly 
attractive to policymakers as a means to promote stability and control events 
in pursuit of perceived national interests. This short-term remedy, however, 
produced some undesirable side effects. These policymakers thus acquired 
the habit of using military force to secure political solutions.  Washington 
assigned the military the job of training foreign soldiers and police, not in the 
art of war, but in the art of enforcing domestic obedience and political stability. 
The U.S. military would, therefore, be the conduit through which Washington 
could engineer peace or conduct war by proxy abroad. 
In all three country case studies, Washington assigned members of its 
armed forces to simultaneously accomplish two diametrically opposing 
missions--war making and nation building. Arguably, both were conducted at 
the expense of the supposed benefactors -the citizens of Central America 
and the Caribbean. 140 
At times this required those in Washington to perform significant feats of 
political acrobatics to reconcile the ideals of democracy with their aggressive 
quest for hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.  Foreign policy had to 
change and adapt to meet ever-growing, if ill-defined, national interests.  In 
the case of Haiti, by installing Dartiguenave as president, the U.S. violated its 
own Tobar Doctrine, a foreign policy keystone, that denied recognition to 
governments established by coup.  Moreover, after dictating the Treaty of 
1915 to Haiti, American officials interpreted that it implied "the lending of  .  .  . 
armed force should internal strife or uprising endanger the existence" of this 
government.4 This was a policy founded on power, rather than legitimacy--a 
problematic course for the "guardian of democracy." 
Marines as Nation Builders 
Warriors usually make better destroyers than builders of nations.  The 
primary role of every military is to conquer and defeat an enemy, period. 
Nations socialize their soldiers to produce results--to attain assigned military 
objectives despite overwhelming odds, formidable obstacles, and high costs. 
Discipline and loyalty are key virtues to the warrior. To succeed in combat, 
democratic methods and individual rights become rightfully subservient to 
mission accomplishment. These characteristics and virtues serve a military 
force well on the field of battle; in fact they are often requisites for survival. 
These same institutional and personal traits, however, can be dysfunctional 
in diplomacy, politics, and civil administration. 141 
In Haiti military intervention turned into nation building, and the Marines 
did not prove to be the best tool for the job. As the nation's shock troops, they 
were not trained to restructure societies.  Not accustomed to failure in any 
form, however, these Marines succeeded in building impressive monuments 
of material progress. Unfortunately, as Robert and Nancy Heinl point out in 
their book Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People. 1492-1971, they 
built them on a sand foundation, for their efforts fell into ruin once the U.S. 
removed the political and economic supports that propped them up.5 Herein 
lay a critical flaw of the intervention, for in the end the obtrusive style, not the 
accomplishments of the Marines, was remembered.6 In essence, it was the 
means and not the ends that made a lasting impression on the emerging 
Latin American view of the U.S. 
The Perversion of Tradition 
To implement such an ambitious policy of intervention, the U.S. had to 
abandon much of its military tradition.  U.S. military members trained foreign 
soldiers to fight and control their own people rather than to defend against an 
external enemy.  Because the intervention required members of the U.S. 
military to focus on domestic conditions, it created an environment that placed 
a premium on their effective manipulation of political and social dynamics. 
Consequently, U.S. foreign policy empowered Marines, soldiers, and naval 
personnel with the political power to control domestic affairs. These service 
members were often, for all intents and purposes, beyond civil control. Time 
and again, civilian chiefs deferred to Marine and naval commanders in 142 
making critical  non-military decisions during these  interventions.  This 
condition was further aggravated by the general lack in clarity of purpose, 
coordinated effort, and unity of administration during these interventions. 
U.S. military participants performed civil functions that fell far outside the 
boundaries of American tradition. The political role that these forces played 
was the result of acts of commission and omission by both Washington and 
these men in  uniform.  The normal checks to  U.S.  military  authority 
diminished  during  these  expeditions.  Consequently, some of these 
servicemen acted independently and outside the normal  U.S.  political 
structure. The design of policy, lack of guidance and supervision, and the 
ambitions of individual players, served to politicize the military members 
serving on this detached duty.  This was unglamorous, demanding duty; 
however, unlike their counterparts in the U.S., these men gained additional 
rights and privileges instead of surrendering them as a result of their service. 
They were communal advisors, justices of the peace, revenue collectors, and, 
in the end, some acted not unlike many of the caudillo warlords of the 
region's past. 
In Nicaragua, Marines controlled the election machinery of the country, 
while  Marine General Fe land  appeared  to  be  serving  as President 
Moncada's secretary of war. With little guidance from Washington, American 
policy in the early phases of the Dominican intervention was the product of 
Military Governor Knapp. Throughout most of the nineteen-year occupation 
of Haiti, High Commissioner Russell and the Gendarmerie commandants 
held both military and political posts at the same time. 143 
These interventions established military governments behind the facade 
of native sovereignty, a strategy destined to produce disappointing long-term 
results. Because of the frequency and duration of U.S. military intervention 
during  this period, General Russell warned that,  "special  missions," a 
secondary function of the Marines, was becoming viewed by observers as the 
"Master Work of the Marine Corps."' However, upon her return from Haiti, 
Emily Balch highlighted the more significant threat that such a policy abroad 
posed for democracy at home.  For, she warned, "Haiti constitutes a clear 
challenge to all who believe in the fundamental principle upon which the 
United States was founded -that government should rest upon the consent of 
the governed."8 
Factors Leading to Failure 
With missionary zeal, many U.S. officials devoted themselves to the work 
of nation building.  Unfortunately, this often represented part of the problem. 
Since most Latin Americans did not solicit the services of these "missionaries 
of democracy," they did not care to hear, much less desire to apply, the 
message they brought. This was difficult for many Americans to understand, 
as Marine First Lieutenant Robert C. Kilmartin concluded: "Also there are 
Dominican citizens of high standing who, although they know that the United 
States is their friend, feel that their independence and the sovereignty of their 
nation is [sic] so dear to them that they want to govern themselves even 
though they cannot do it as well as we can."9 144 
During the initial establishment of military government in the Dominican 
Republic, Sumner Welles provided another view.  He summed up the 
immediate situation that resulted: 
The extraordinary anomaly was thus presented in a brief ten days  
[after Knapp's declaration  of  martial  law]  of the creation  of a  
government of the Dominican Republic, headed by an officer of the  
American Navy, with a cabinet composed of officers of the U.S. Navy  
or Marine Corps, none of whom had any knowledge or experience in  
Dominican affairs or problems, and a great majority of whom could  
not even speak the language of the country.'°  
Marines and other U.S. officials were, nonetheless, proud of their efforts and 
boasted that they had "lost no time in laying the foundation of a new political, 
economic and social era" to turn over to inhabitants upon their departure.11 
Some of these officers, like Marine Colonel Rufus Lane, admitted that, 
there were also those officials "who were inclined to be somewhat arbitrary 
and to apply military principles and discipline to the civilian population at 
large."12 Challenger notes some of the unforeseen repercussions of military 
government, commenting: 
Moreover, in Latin America both military and civilian policymakers  
had equated order and stability with sound finances and conservative  
governments. No thought had been given to the political and social  
consequences of American policy: how, for example, an intervention  
might work for the benefit of an entrenched clique or elite, might stir  
popular resentment, and might stimulate the very forces of instability  
that American policy had sought to prevent.13  
More recent appraisals  of this  period  of  intervention  bear this same 
interpretation.  Pointing to the U.S. geo-political  inspirations during this 
period, Shirley Christian disassociates American actions from the later rise of 
Somoza's dynasty.  However, she concludes that  the  occupation  of 145 
Nicaragua "focused more on democratization of the economy than political 
development."14  V. G. Kiernan went further to argue that instead  of 
transforming Nicaragua or the Dominican Republic, U.S. intervention created 
a "symbiosis of local politics with American finance, likely to bring out the 
worst attributes of both. "15 
Law and order promoted capital investment but did little to meet the needs 
of economic distribution.  During and since this period of intervention, the 
U.S. and the Latin American governments have often focused more on 
economic growth than development.  Although arguing  the  merits of 
constabularies in their potential to establish stability in 1926,  Marine Major 
Keyser admonished the State Department's failure to understand that the 
general poverty of the masses was, itself, a fundamental source of the cycle 
of violence in this region.16 He astutely noted that violence and poverty feed 
off each other. Marines could temporarily and artificially intervene physically 
to circumvent the first, however, to no lasting effect without meeting the latter. 
The difficulty that Marines encountered in trying to import the U.S. 
modeled Guardia in many ways represented the futility of American reforms 
by fiat. For as Calder argues, "Traditional Dominican political culture shaped 
the evolution of the Guardia, not poorly conceived or executed hopes of the 
occupiers."17 According to the Law Officer of the Second Brigade of Marines 
in the Dominican Republic, the mission of the Marines was "To return to the 
people of this Republic their "self-government," returning it in a fashion that 
makes clear to the Dominican people that the United States has helped and 
that it has done so unselfishly."18 This was a difficult,  if not an impossible, 
mission to ask anyone to accomplish, even American Marines. 146 
To the citizens of occupied nations, the reality of American foreign policy 
was that U.S. intervention, with "entirely unselfish motives  .  .  .  to insure, 
establish, and help to maintain" their independence resulted in two decades 
of foreign  occupation and  military government.19  In  1921, a Marine 
commander wrote the Secretary of the Navy acknowledging, "We have 
committed errors.  The corvee was an error, for by unjust enforcement in 
certain localities,  it brought doubt into the mind of the Haitian Lsic] of the 
altruism of our intentions."2° 
To many Latin Americans, incidents like this not only brought into question 
the altruistic intentions of the U.S. but tied American "democracy" to military 
rule and foreign domination.  It was easy for Haitians and other Latin 
Americans to associate the actions of Marines with their country's long 
lineage of military governments that enjoyed authority derived from force 
rather than from political legitimacy.  Because of this interpretation, many 
Latin Americans would eventually associate the Marine occupation with the 
worst aspects of Latin American military tradition--the self-seeking control of 
the poor masses by an elite commanding the politics of guns. 
A Return to Home Shores and Traditions 
If the Spanish American War of 1898 marked the departure from U.S. 
military tradition in the conduct of foreign policy, the U.S. withdrawal from 
Haiti in 1934 marked the point of return.  Withdrawing their troops from 
Central  America  and  the  Caribbean,  the  Hoover  and  Roosevelt 
administrations eventually renounced the use of military occupation as a tool 147 
of foreign policy, and, as Mil lett concludes, few Marines regretted their 
departure from the tropics.21  Moreover, Challenger argues strongly that the 
military, as an institution, has demonstrated a longstanding aversion to 
political activism, claiming that: 
Men like Dewey had grown up with and learned to accept the "givens" 
of their status. They did not believe that it was the proper function of 
military men to exercise a "political" role; rather they felt that it was the 
responsibility of the civilian leadership to determine national policy 
and then tell the military what it was and how it was to be executed. 
Indeed, many of their complaints suggest that they wanted not so 
much to share in the actual policymaking process as to be furnished 
with firm guidelines and directives.22 
Events immediately following the U.S. withdrawal would provide further 
support for this assertion. After its departure from Central America and the 
Caribbean, the U.S. military did not try to reassert itself into the domain of 
non-military functions that defined much of its participation during this period 
of intervention. Nor did policymakers seek their services in such a role.  By 
1934, few Americans supported a policy of Latin American independence 
through U.S. intervention. 
Although U.S. foreign policy often lacked "firm guidelines and directives" 
during this period, the armed services also suffered from deficiencies in 
institutional doctrine defining their role in national strategy.  This was most 
pronounced in the case of the U.S. Marine Corps.  In 1916, General Russell 
complained that, "all Great Powers of the world, except the U.S. have instilled 
into their armies and navies doctrines of war."23 This lack of Marine doctrine 
facilitated Washington and the State Department's use of this Corps as an 
attractive  political expedient  to overcome challenges  to foreign  policy 148 
objectives.  It also gave these policymakers greater prerogative not only to 
define the criteria for the deployment of Marines but to shape the nature of 
their military duties overseas. 
Marines, like their civilian counterparts, had grown weary of the "Banana 
Wars." Eager to distance themselves from both the civil responsibilities and 
public criticisms that accompanied colonial administration, Marines returned 
from the tropics and refocused on conventional tactics and warfighting.24 
Marines began writing, "It now appears probable that the period of wars of 
intervention may be ended just are the Indian wars, the guarding of our 
western frontiers and protecting our commerce against pirates."25 Generals 
Fuller and Russell, both veterans of Haiti, would eventually serve as Marine 
Commandants, yet the impact of their small war experience on the leadership 
of the Marines would largely end by 1936 at the conclusion of their terms. 
The concern over the lack of doctrine led the major general commandant of 
the Marine Corps to suspend officer training at the Basic School for the 1933-
1934 class so that students and faculty could publish the Tentative Manual for 
Landing Operations and Small Wars Operations.26 
Without the lure of empire, American policymakers and military leaders 
re-oriented their views, defining a more conventional role for the U.S. armed 
forces.  General John Lejeune's new emphasis on amphibious warfare 
overshadowed the small war lessons of banana warriors like Merritt Edson 
and Chesty Puller at formal Marine schools.  This return to conventional 
warfare would dominate Marine organization,  training,  and warfighting 
doctrine through the Vietnam War. 149 
The Legacy and Future of U.S. Military Intervention  
In the words of Marine Lieutenant Kilmartin, "The Policia  Nacional 
Dominicana is on trial in maintaining peace and order in the Republic. That 
military body is the product of our labors, and its success will  be our 
success."27 History would demonstrate that Latin Americans would also credit 
the U.S. and its Marines with the failures and abuses of this body.  Calder 
claims that the ultimate success of this Marine-led force during the guerrilla 
war represented: "The death of the old political system.  .  .  .  No longer would 
the central government be forced to negotiate with eastern caudillos to gain 
the region's alliance.  Never again would these traditional leaders defy the 
central government or raise their followers in rebellion."28 
President Harding's special commissioner to the Dominican Republic, 
Sumner Welles, summarized the benefits of the U.S. occupation  in this 
Republic as "infinitesimal [in] importance when compared to the suspicions, 
fears, and hatred to which the Occupation gave rise throughout the American 
continent and when compared to the lasting hostility towards the American 
people which the Occupation created in the hearts of a very great number of 
the Dominican people."29  U.S. interventions in Nicaragua and Haiti also 
stirred these same sentiments among several participants and observers 
alike. Together these incursions combined to create a recurring pattern of 
troubled  U.S.-Latin American  relations.  In  this  relationship  the  U.S. 
employed its economic, political, and military power to circumvent Latin 
American sovereignty.  This left a legacy that lasted far beyond the U.S. 
withdrawal from colonial empire. 150 
American arrogance and racism also undermined U.S. efforts and further 
damaged future relations between neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. 
The racial prejudices and sense of moral mission commonly found in the U.S. 
during this period also affected the military's attitude toward and subsequent 
conduct with Latin American officials. This was typified by Admiral Sperry's 
judgment that, "the so-called revolutions are nothing more nor less than 
struggles between different crews of bandits for the possession of the custom 
houses--and the loot."30 Smedley Butler himself did not hesitate to recount 
before Congress that Marines were, "imbued with the fact that we were 
trustees of a huge estate that belonged to minors."31  Later he would take 
great pride in disclosing that, "it was my ambition to make Haiti a first-class 
black man's country."32 Although the blame for these prevailing views may 
rest more with the character of the period than the character of the 
individuals, the attitude and conduct of these Americans were, nonetheless, 
destined to have a detrimental impact on future U.S. relations with Latin 
Americans. 
Latin American Military Tradition: The U.S. as Mentor 
During the course of U.S. intervention  in  Nicaragua,  Haiti, and the 
Dominican Republic, the conduct of U.S. military officials often provided 
examples that contradicted "democracy" as defined  by the American 
experience. For in many ways, the U.S. created "a government of men and 
not of laws."  The "men" were Admiral Snowden, Generals Russell and 
Fe land, and other military commanders that simultaneously served as U.S. 151 
proconsuls and foreign government officials. Their conduct on foreign shores 
went well beyond their mandate to "assist in military and naval matters."33 
Without popular native support, the U.S. sought to establish democracies 
through martial law enforced by American-led constabularies and backed by 
formidable Marine forces.  Washington was slow to learn that it could not 
hope to transplant democracy, much less inspire native democratic rule 
through military occupation. 
This approach did, however, risk inspiring emulation by future Latin 
American militaries. This appears to be part of the "double-edged" legacy of 
the American policy of intervention during this period, wherein the U.S. 
reaped unintended results.  In  all three country case studies examined, 
Marines  fought  insurgencies,  were  involved  with  public  works  and 
development  projects,  and exercised  significant  political  influence  or 
governed directly. These same elements would reappear in the increasing 
military activism that later emerged throughout Latin America. The future role 
of the these militaries would also focus on counter-insurgency, civic-action 
and nation building tasks. These same militaries, however, would not usher 
in a new democratic era, but rather military dictatorship. 
Laguerre summarizes the unintended legacy of U.S. military intervention: 
[Haitian] Army corruption that was so common in the nineteenth  
century assumed a bureaucratic form during the U.S. occupation.  
This institutionalized corruption was in part owing to the marines' two  
salaries, one from the Haitian government and the other from the U.S.  
government. Haitian soldiers were very much aware of this disparity  
between the marines' income and their own single source of salary  
from the Haitian government, and it did not take much time for some of  
them to identify potential, extralegal sources of revenue to make up  
for what they perceived as deficient salaries.  The deficiency was  
corrected either through corruption or through pursuit of careers on  152 
the side. Because the U.S. Marines had in the Gendarmerie higher 
ranks than the ones held in the Marine Corps, this factor had a 
positive impact on the salaries they received from the Haitian 
government. The marines kept the best jobs for themselves and, in 
terms of promotions, gave priority to their own soldiers over Haitian 
soldiers. This was interpreted as a form of paternalism and patronage. 
The influence of the marines on the political system was also noticed 
by the Haitian officers. Since, during the occupation, the president of 
Haiti was receiving his orders from the leadership of the marines, 
during the period of Haitianization of the army, the president was to 
receive those orders from the leadership of the Haitian army.  The 
framework for direct or indirect military intervention in the affairs of the 
state was already established. By this route of precedence, the roots 
of the new forms of civil-military relationship must be sought in the 
groundwork laid by the US occupation.34 
Brenda Plummer went further to say that the intervention did not reform, but 
instead strengthened the survival of the worst features of the Haitian military 
tradition .35 
Following the U.S. military interventions in Nicaragua, the Dominican 
Republic, and Haiti,  most observers were also disappointed  with the 
American-organized constabularies. The results of the constabulary system 
fell far short of U.S. expectations--the establishment of apolitical militaries that 
could break the cycle of Latin American political violence by providing the 
stability needed to mediate social unrest and economic irresponsibility. 
Throughout Central America and the Caribbean, Latin Americans resisted the 
constabulary system.36 Despite the devoted efforts by those responsible for 
the training of these forces, they remained political instruments of force 
consistent with the military heritage of these republics. American intervention 
had only made them better organized, equipped, trained, and led.  By 
institutionalizing  these  militaries  through  "professionalization,"  the  U.S. 
merely made them more efficient and effective, not less politically active. The 153 
disappointing outcome of this policy was apparent even at the time of the 
U.S. withdrawal.  It was no secret that these constabularies had yet to break 
from the military legacies of the past. The Marines and constabularies knew 
this, as did many citizens North and South.37 
This was one of the most damaging and enduring inheritances of the U.S. 
intervention.  Upon the departure of American forces, these constabularies 
eventually became the praetorian guards for oppressive regimes. Anastasio 
Somoza Garcia, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo,  Paul Magloire, and Francois 
Duvalier all used the U.S. created guardias to seize power. Since it helped 
to create the soldiers behind the dictators, many Latin Americans have 
concluded that the U.S. shares responsibility with these regimes for the 
exploitation and oppression of Latin American peoples.  To this day this 
remains a significant thorn  in  the relations between North and  Latin 
Americans.  Although  the  U.S.  intervention  during  this  period  is  not 
responsible for these later developments, it is difficult to imagine that it did not 
at least help to model, facilitate, and lend credibility to the future heritage of 
Latin American military intervention. 
After his retirement from the Marines, General Smedley Butler unleashed 
a bitter campaign against his arch enemies--the political bureaucrats and 
power brokers  in  America.  Although  not shared  by many Marine 
commanders at the time, the renegade Butler expressed a sentiment that was 
not only an indictment of the U.S. intervention during this period but a 
revealing glimpse of the dangers in politicizing the military. More importantly, 
it represented the destructive perceptions created in the minds of both 
participants and observers by a foreign policy that asked Marines to perform 154 
duties in  conflict with democratic principles.  Perceptions often become 
reality. Whether or not Butler's charges were an accurate appraisal of the 
U.S. intervention perhaps mattered less than did the fact that many Latin 
Americans shared his conclusions. 
Ramifications for the Future 
To meet the variety of U.S. foreign policy objectives in an emerging "New 
World Order," the U.S. Marine Corps doctrine of amphibious warfare was 
found wanting.  Reminiscent of the turn of the twentieth century, U.S. 
policymakers cast their eyes on foreign shores and began rethinking the 
military's role in the future attainment of foreign policy objectives. During the 
late  1980's, Marine Amphibious Units were once again renamed and 
organized into Marine Expeditionary Units.  This was not merely political 
window dressing by the Marine Corps in its perennial fight for survival as an 
institution but represented an important shift in the evolving role of the U.S. 
military to meet the most likely global contingencies -Low Intensity Conflicts 
(LICs), a.k.a. small wars.  Throughout the 1980s, Washington refocused on 
the domestic affairs of its neighbors and pursued the global projection of U.S. 
military power.  Once again, many in Washington redefined the world in 
political terms necessitating military solutions. With the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War, the U.S., by default, has moved closer to 
global hegemony.  With the emergence of the New World Order, Marines 
have again deployed to Latin America and Africa. 155 
The U.S. has taken a leading role in the international war on drugs and 
terrorism and  in  global  humanitarian  intervention.  In  assuming  the 
responsibilities of peacekeeping, U.S. policymakers are prudent to guard 
against abandoning democratic traditions in the pursuit of national interests. 
They must also keep in mind that Marines, soldiers, sailors, and airmen  are 
warriors and not nation builders. As the U.S. continues to project its military 
power across the seas, policymakers must revisit the lessons of "small wars" 
and forever resist the temptation of pursuing foreign policy that substitutes 
devil dogs for diplomats. 156 
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